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6CHAPTER 1 – THE PROBLEM FIELD & PROBLEM FORMULATION
OVERVIEW
There are several sources from which electricity can be generated and several ways in which
it can be delivered to its point of use.  Today’s electricity is generated mostly from limited sources,
with which are associated a number of undesirable consequences.  It is also delivered, for the most
part, in a central fashion.  That is, a relatively small number of electricity generating plants, most
remotely located relative to population centres, deliver electricity across power lines to its multiple
points of use.  It has evolved largely because of social, market, and technological conditions that
are increasingly less prevalent today.  While there are benefits to central generation, this chapter
will focus on the problems with the overall electricity strategy as it exists today and overview the
benefits and barriers to an alternative electricity strategy whose ultimate aim is to better match
electricity generation in time, place and magnitude from sources having fewer undesirable
consequences associated with their use.  Ultimately, the stage will be set for an exploration into one
possible subset of such an alternative system, using one particular location, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada, and one particular electricity generating technology for analytic and illustrative purposes.
The city of Toronto was chosen simply because it is of interest to the author and the ‘Turby’, a
small, vertical axis wind turbine, was chosen for reasons elicited below.  Subsequent chapters will
explore the feasibility of generating electricity from Turbys located on the roofs of commercial
buildings in Toronto, the effectiveness of such a strategy at addressing the undesirable side effects
of today’s system, and the various types of changes needed to take place in order for such a strategy
to actualize.
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH TODAY’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM
Problems Associated with Generation
A Reliance on Finite Sources of Energy.  Most generally, electricity can be generated
from finite or renewable sources.  At present, it is the finite sources from which electricity is mostly
procured: in the year 2000, approximately 81 per cent of electricity worldwide was generated from
such sources1.  These include the fossil fuels, namely  oil, natural gas, and coal which should last
for an indeterminate number of decades2,3,4,5,  or even a couple of centuries in the case of coal6, and
uranium which could last for a significant period of time, perhaps thousands of years7.  The use of
non-conventional sources of fossil fuels may become more feasib le with technological advances,
as might gains in efficiency of use and possible efforts at conservation, but such actions can not
avoid the eventual consumption of these resources past points of obligate demand.
Detrimental Health Effects.  While debate certainly roars over the exact health effects of
burning fossil fuels in general, there is little doubt that the air pollution that results is associated
with undesirable health impacts on human populations8.  One recent study estimates that for
Austria, France, and Switzerland combined, about 40 000 deaths per year, or six per cent of deaths,
are attributable to air pollution, although the breakdown by source was limited to stating that about
half of this was thought to be from traffic pollution9.  Similarly high numbers were estimated for
respiratory and cardiovascular hospital admissions, bronchitis episodes, and restricted activity days.
Of course, like all science with significant policy implications, the exact numbers are contested10,
but it is more a question of the extent of undesirability than whether the pollution is undesirable
or not. That is, while different sides of the debate might perceive the problem to big or small, all
7sides would rather not see it at all.
These kinds of numbers can have large impacts on humans and their systems.  In terms of
economic impacts, one 1997 World Bank study outlined the potential health costs related solely
to particulate exposure in China, most of which comes from burning coal11.  Should there be no
change in the rates of consumption of fossil fuels, costs are expected to rise from $32 billion in
1995 to $390 billion in 2020. This includes 600,000 premature deaths, 5.5 million cases of chronic
bronchitis, 5 billion restricted activity days and 20 million cases of respiratory illness annually.
In terms of the country and city under investigation here, the Canadian government
estimates that reducing smog could save Canada C$10 billion annually 12.  The municipal
government of Toronto estimates that annually over 5,500 Torontonians are hospitalized from smog
related illness and over 1,000 of them die13.  Again, it is difficult to tease out exactly to what extent
this is due to electricity generation versus other sources of pollutants (Toronto is in the province
of Ontario which produces just over 25% of its electricity from coal and 12% from oil and gas14),
but it is safe to say that pollution from electricity generation at least contributes to these costs,
illnesses and early deaths.
Detrimental Ecological Effects.  While the side-effects of electricity generation on human
health could be considered an ecological effect, human health is more commonly considered
separately.  Chief amongst the detrimental ecological effects of today’s reliance on fossil fuels for
electricity are the effects on climate stability.  Burning fossil fuels leads to the production of
greenhouse gases (GHGs). While not strictly pollutants, the emission of GHGs has become a
concern, particularly in the last ten to fifteen years, as these gases are building up in the atmosphere
in quantities thought to be capable of warming the earth to such an extent as to affect climate
stability and an ensuing host of related ecological problems (water cycles, tide levels, drought,
blight, bio-diversity reduction and species migration amongst several others)15.
The phenomenon of global climate change poses a significant challenge for those who
would like to quantify its costs in some fashion.  The global climate system is highly complex, it
is influenced by multiple variables and its precise workings are not completely understood.  How
these interact with human systems is a further complication.  While the majority of climate
scientists agree that it is chiefly human activity that is responsible for the climate changes of the
last century15, the exact extent of our influence is not known and might not be knowable.  Similarly,
the exact effects on the economy of collective global action, or inaction, to reduce emissions are
not, and might never, be known.  Despite the difficulties, attempts have been and are being made
to determine the measurable costs of climate change.  The United Nations Environment Program,
for example, estimates global economy losses as a result of natural disasters to be doubling every
decade and to have reached one trillion US dollars in the past 15 years – losses will reach around
US$150 billion annually by 2012 if current trends continue16.  One insurance expert, from one of
the world’s largest insurance companies, has warned that damage caused by climate change is
increasing by an average of ten per cent a year and would, at this rate, surpass global economic
growth by the year 206517.
Increased heat will exacerbate the smog-related costs and deaths mentioned above but it will
also incur costs on its own.  Environment Canada, for example, estimates that by 2020 the number
of heat-related deaths in Toronto will increase 15 times to almost 300 people each year as the
climate warms18. While Canada’s GHG emissions increased about 1.6% per year over the 1990s,
emissions from electricity generation increased about 2.7% per year during that time and stood at
over 17% of Canada’s total emissions by the end of the decade18.
* The term ‘delivery’ is used here to include both of the terms ‘transmission’ and ‘distribution’ which have
particular meanings in electrical system parlance but need not be distinguished for the purposes of this paper.
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Other ecological damage includes acidic precipitation from fossil fuel combustion, which,
while reduced, is still a C$1 billion problem annually in Canada19, and pollutants (a third of which
come from electricity plants) are still emitted at a rate above targets set in international
agreements20,21, let alone reduced to zero.  There is also ecological damage done by flooding during
the formation of hydroelectric dams (in 2000, 59.2% of Canada’s electricity came from
hydropower1), and GHG release from such dams as the flooded forest begins to decompose.
Nuclear Issues.  While nuclear power might be able to satisfy electricity needs for a
significant period of time and it emits no air-borne pollutants or GHGs, there are a number of
reasons why it is less than an ideal fashion to generate electricity.  Most significantly is the present
inability to satisfactorily treat or contain radioactive waste and the highly destructive impacts of
nuclear reactor ‘meltdowns’ which inevitably, though rarely, occur22,23,24.  In Canada, nuclear
reactors have proven to not live as long, nor function as reliably as once hoped which means that
coal plants are often run as backup25,26.  As markets liberalize, investors see nuclear as increasingly
risky and unattractive economically, making private financing for such projects more difficult to
come by27,28 .  This could change should fossil fuel prices rise, should renewable prices not lower
with or in time and should governments step in to secure financing and liability protection.  At the
moment this last possibility seems unlikely as many governments are trying to phase out nuclear
power25.  A notable exception to this trend, however, is the United States, whose federal
government is moving to support more nuclear electricity generation29.
With an increase in concern in developed nations over terrorist attacks, nuclear power plants
are thought to be an enticing target and therefore have now acquired this additional liability.
Nuclear power plants are now increasingly guarded as a result30, further increasing the costs of their
operation.
Problems Associated with Delivery 
Social Dependency. Having electricity generated at a distance and delivered* from a small
number of generating plants to a large number of customers creates the architecture of dependency
and thus the potential for abuse.  Public defence can and does occur in the form of government or
independent regulators.  It can, in theory, also occur in the form of the market, but only should
healthy market conditions exist.
The one province in Canada that fully deregulated its electricity market experienced a sharp
rise in prices which has remained for over two years now and on occasion rose up to five times the
previous average31.  Time has not improved the situation which was initially sold to the public as
a way to reduce already low prices even further.  The issue has recently surged again in the public
arena as that government announced a policy change that will require tax payers to pay the full
C$1-billion cost of transmission line expansion and not prospective new generation businesses.
While the government is admitting that all is not well, it insists that rules can be decided upon
which will ameliorate the situation.  Others, however, see a market structure that does not allow
for healthy competition regardless of which rules are established, and a population neither able nor
willing to adapt to a more active and demanding consumer role with respect to its electricity
choices32.  They are presently calling for the resignation of the energy minister for, in their view,
having failed to properly defend the public interest33.
9Energy Insecurity.  While the individual security can be at risk to those with less money,
given the dependency architecture of central generation, the collective security is also more fragile
 in this arrangement. Should dependency occur across nations, the potential for abuse can turn into
the potential for conflict or to environmental compromise.  Germany, for example, has a coalition
red-green government that would like to reduce its coal use and the pollution associated with it but
does not do so, in part, for fear of further dependency on imported energy34.
Like individual generation stations such as the nuclear power stations mentioned above,
transmission lines are also potential terrorist targets.  Damage can result from weather events as
well of course.   In 1998, an ice-storm hit northeastern North America and sent some of Canada’s
most populated areas into a state of emergency35.  Over 5 million people experienced power outages
in the middle of the winter, most for a number of days, some for weeks, as transmission lines and
poles broke under the weight of the ice.  Approximately 600,000 people had to be evacuated from
their homes and communities.  An estimated C$7 billion of damage occurred.  The sale of personal
electricity generators of all types increased dramatically.  While no one natural disaster can be
attributed to global climate change, this episode, along with others, are increasingly being labelled
as “consistent” with climate change predictions and more likely to occur in the future.
Energy Inefficiency.  A small number of large power plants delivering electricity to large
number of small customers across lengthy transmission lines might have at one time been the most
economically efficient manner to arrange the electricity system but it was never an energetically
efficient strategy.  Energy is mismatched with demand in time, magnitude and place: waste heat
is often not purposefully used, large plants must sometimes be started up only to function at less
than capacity levels in order to meet transient needs, and power lines themselves cause a loss of
energy.  In all, including losses from transmission and distribution systems, the worldwide waste
of energy arising from central generation is about the same as the total amount of energy consumed
by the global transportation sector36.
Undesirable Health Effects.  Another health concern specific to electricity delivery is the
effect of the magnetic fields of transmission lines on human health.  A US National Academy of
Sciences 1996 analysis of studies exploring the association between childhood leukaemia suggested
that residence near power lines was associated with an elevated risk of childhood leukaemia (50%
more likely), but not with other cancers37.  A similar association between cancer and residential
exposure of adults was not seen from these studies.
THE CLEAN DISTRIBUTED GENERATION SOLUTION
The problems of today’s foremost strategies with respect to both the generation and delivery
of electricity are increasingly apparent and significant.  Generation from finite fossil fuels, nuclear
and large-scale hydro results in ecological destruction, climate instability, public health
deterioration, and a higher vulnerability to attack.  Delivery of electricity over large distances from
a relatively small number of large plants creates dependency and the potential for public abuse and
conflict, a greater vulnerability to attack, additional health effects and is not energetically efficient.
Clearly it would be desirable to generate electricity in ways that result in fewer or no deleterious
emissions or radioactivity problems affecting health, climate or the ecosystem generally.  It would
also be desirable to better match such generation in time, place and magnitude with its point of use
while simultaneously increasing individual consumer energy independence.
One possible solution would therefore seem to be to foster multiple points of generation
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taking place at, or very near their points of use.  These should generate electricity from sources that
are, for most purposes at least, infinite and which are not associated with negative health or
ecosystem impacts.  This solution could be called the ‘Clean Distributed Generation’ solution.
Terms and Technologies.  The term ‘distributed generation’ (DG), in the context of
electricity system architectures, is used to describe electric power generation that occurs near or
immediately at the consumer site or electricity load being served.  It is also referred to as
distributed power, micropower, neighborhood energy, self-generation, on-site power, embedded
generation or dispersed power.  It should not, although it sometimes is, be confused with the term
‘distributed energy resources’, which refers to the broader concept of all the ways that energy
services can be obtained in a distributed or local manner: from ground-source heat pumps and
energy efficiency, to local-grid technologies and DG.
  The main technologies used for DG, in approximate order of use, are diesel engines, gas
engines, micro-turbines, hydrogen fuel cells and solar photovoltaic devices (PV).  Although small
sca le hydro, small wind turbines, electricity from landfill waste (for example, through plasma
gasification and vitrification technology38) and biomass should also be considered.
‘Clean DG’ here refers to DG derived from renewable sources producing no deleterious
emissions.  This includes DG from PV, wind, and small hydro.  It can also refer to fuel cells but
only if the hydrogen is generated from renewable sources.  ‘Cleaner DG’ here refers to DG that
emits some undesirable emissions but less so because: 1. surplus heat is captured for local use thus
reducing emissions compared to that which would result should the electricity and heat be
generated separately (this is called co-generation), or,  2. emissions result from sustainably
harvested biomass, or, 3. emissions are lower than other technologies (natural gas turbines emit
fewer pollutants than diesel for example).   Placing clean or cleaner before DG might seem like
redundant terminology to some as DG of any kind, given its close proximity and appropriateness
of scale, can be less polluting than central generation.  However, they are used here to further
distinguish amongst those technologies that more fully address the problems outlined above.
Benefits and Drivers.  The multiple problems addressed above create a general motivation
for the DG strategy.  Many more specific benefits to DG are often quoted than those of health
improvement, climate stabilization, energy security, energy independence and whole-system energy
efficiency.  One group of authors, for example, list 207 benefits of DG shared to a varying extent
across society and over time39.  Most of these specific benefits, however, are variants or extensions
of the broader themes.  Amongst the more commonly cited specific benefits are increased electrical
reliability,  displacement of costly electricity from the grid (especially during peak periods),
deferral of investments in network expansion by governments or utilities,  avoidance of
transmission and distribution costs, utilisation of heat from generators (co-generation), and
opportunism of proximity to landfill sites.
While benefits are why DG might be desirable, other elements make DG more possible.
DG will progress mostly as a result of technological development, electricity market liberalization
and government regulations such as renewable energy portfolios, higher peak-rate pricing and
others40.  The role of different facilitating policies will be addressed in more detail in future
chapters.  All of these drivers, however, are increasingly helping create opportunities for feasible
and affordable clean DG.
Remaining Barriers.  Significant barriers remain, however, before these opportunities can
be fully realized.  Again, these will be addressed more fully in future chapters and simply
summarized here.   Policy barriers are seemingly associated with a lack of knowledge about, or
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consideration of, DG during the development of competition rules in regional electricity markets.
More specifically, these rules often entail troublesome and costly arrangements for grid
interconnection, restrictive siting, permitting, access and pricing rules for DG suppliers, and no or
little recognition of the locational value of DG (for example through transmission and distribution
system capital deferral, grid reinforcement and reduction of grid losses).  Technological barriers
persist as well, as the higher price per unit of electricity for clean DG often makes it economically
unattractive for the individual consumer depending on market prices of fuel and electricity.  These
should lower with time due to scaling up of production and through further technological
development.  In addition to the regional market prices of fuel and electricity, other market barriers
include financing obstacles, as most DG technologies’ costs are up-front capital costs.  Associated
transaction costs are also higher as a fraction of total project costs than for larger projects and incur
at the beginning of project development thus amplifying overall financial risk.  Finally , the most
pervasive market barrier is a general lack of awareness about DG technologies.  One survey found
an awareness of micro-turbines and co-generation in North America to be 51 and 56 percent,
respectively, among surveyed commercial and industrial customers on the continent41.
Future Visions.  DG is actually a former electricity system architecture experiencing
significant regrowth.  Globally, at 7% of total orders, more DG capacity was ordered in 2000 than
new nuclear power capacity37.  While the exact future of DG is speculative and contested, none
disagree that it will at least play an increasing role in electricity generation worldwide37,42,43,44.
Some assert, however, that DG will eventually play a preeminent role in future electricity
generation – it is just a matter of how quickly markets and policy makers allow it to compete36,45.
Some see DG as an inevitable universal destiny and a defining attribute of an equitable and
democratic hydrogen-based society46.  Others see an eventual integration of the new system
accompanied by transformation of the old system in a similar fashion as the development of
personal computing and the internet.  The latter point out that the large scale introduction of small
personal computers did not mean the death of large mainframes which still exist in increasing
numbers and sophistication and are crucial to the growth of the internet47,48.  Indeed, the term
distributed generation derives from the term distributed computing49.
World Survey41.  When barriers are removed, or even despite them, DG can prosper as seen
in its degree of penetration into some markets.  Figure 1 depicts the top countries in order of DG
penetrance as well as an estimated world average (~7%). The top 3 countries hold a 40% share of
DG worldwide.  Co-generation makes up the overwhelming majority of DG worldwide at an
estimated 96% of DG.  The worldwide DG estimate of 7% means that the present installed capacity
worldwide is likely around 230 GWe and the total generation is about 1,000 TWh (almost
equivalent to the total annual power generation of Japan).
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Figure 1.  DG development worldwide as a percentage of total power generation41.
EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES OF WIND-BASED DG IN TORONTO
USING A NOVEL ROOFTOP WIND TURBINE – THE ‘TURBY’
Extending the DG Concept.  This paper is an investigation based on a straight forward
extension of the clean distributed generation concept.  The logic is elementary.  If it is desirable,
for a host of reasons, to locate electricity generation immediately at its point of use, and if it is
desirable to generate that electricity in a clean, renewable fashion, then it is follows that it is
desirable to have electricity generated from renewable energy located immediately at its point of
use.  Rooftop wind energy therefore qualifies as a strategy that would be conceptually desirable.
As will be seen in the following chapters, some progress is being made in terms of creating
better conditions for the development and diffusion of clean DG in context under investigation here
–  Canada, and Toronto, Ontario specifically.  However, with the exception of a lone wind turbine
on the Toronto lakeshore, which might not even be strictly considered as DG, little attention is paid
to wind in the urban environment as a source of locally generated electricity.  In fact, one study by
a Canadian utility, B.C. Hydro, dismissed the possibility of wind in the urban environment50.  It
did so, however, because it had a limited definition of a wind turbine. Urban wind was impractical,
it asserted, because a minimum of one acre is usually recommended for a small wind turbine
installation.  While the study’s final conclusion might or might not be presently correct, it might
not continue to be so in the future, and it certainly is not the case that all turbines need an acre of
space. In fact, wind turbines can be found in a variety of designs and sizes that require far less than
an acre of space:  these can be located immediately beside, on top of, or even integrated into the
design of urban buildings51 (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2.  A selection of designs of different wind turbines for the urban environment.  From variations on the Savonius
design (A), to the traditional  daisywheel design (B), to insertion of turbines into building design (C), many  designs have been
investigated (Images from 48).
The Technology Under Investigation.  As an exploration into the possibilities of wind-
based DG, a single location is chosen, as highlighted above, but also a single technology: the
Turby.  The Turby is a small, vertical axis wind turbine with a number of attributes making it
suitable for wind-based DG in the urban setting (Figure 3).  A vertical axis turbine, in contrast to
the more well-known horizontal axis turbines which look like the rotor of an old-fashioned
aeroplane, allows for wind energy to be more readily harvested from all directions.  The angle of
the blades of the Turby also allow for a vertical component of winds to be harvested, which boosts
the turbine’s output and furthers its suitability for rooftops as winds hitting the sides of buildings
flow over the rooftop at an angle.  The Turby  has a peak capacity of 3 kilowatts, a rated capacity
of 2.5 kilowatts, and is promoted by the manufacturer as noiseless past 10 metres, maintenance free
for 20 years, possessing of low vibrations, and can be assembled and disassembled with relative
ease for transport to rooftops and installation.  It is presently not a mass-produced item and so it
sells for about C$15,700 (or about i10,000, US$11,400, 74,200 DKK).
The Turby was selected over other models suitable for rooftops or urban use, as it had the
optimal characteristics sought compared to other designs known to the author.  Every design
incorporates trade-offs.  On any given attribute, the Turby can be beat.  That is, more quiet, less
expensive, less heavy, and more powerful turbines can be found.  But in an overall assessment, the
Turby was optimal.  For example, the design A in Figure 2 was significantly more quiet and only
slightly more expensive.  However, it generated significantly less power at the same wind speeds.
Another vertical ax is wind turbine also looks promising (The Neoga by EcoFys51) but is less
developed as a technology at the present. The integrated wind-turbine concept, while interesting,
was not seen as something that could be developed throughout the city in a rapid time scale in the
same way as modular turbines on rooftops.  Of course, it should be noted that the industry is in its
infancy as so all figures are those of the manufacturers and not of independent testers that have had
years to test the turbines.
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Figure 3.  Basic specifications of the Turby.  This vertical axis wind turbine can be disassembled and
reassembled on rooftops, easing transport and installation.  It presently has two tower height options and a rated power of
2.5 kilowatts.  Noise levels are indistinguishable from background wind at a distance of 10 metres and, at most wind
speeds, the rotation of the blades can not be discerned.  Measures on the left-hand side are in millimetres.  (Source: Core
International52)
Further Constraints. The exploration will be further limited to the rooftops of commercial
buildings for a few reasons.  First, wind speed increases with height and commercial buildings are,
as a group, taller than residential homes.  Also, while 70 decibels is slightly above a normal 
conversation of 60 decibels, but below a vacuum cleaner at 80 decibels, it is likely still too loud
for suburban neighbourhoods.  Commercial sites, often surrounded by roads, highways or even
freeways, would not notice the noise, especially if the Turbys are perched greater than 10 metres
high from street level.  Further, the larger buildings would be better equipped to handle the forces
of, and on the turbine.  Finally, different policy options fostering their use might be easier to
implement in the commercial context, as many businesses have designated people or departments
in charge of, and familiar with, governmental interactions.
As mentioned, wind flow can hit the side of a building and flow around or over it, causing
wind flow at the roof top to be turbulent past a certain height (Figure 3).  In discussions with an
independent tester of the Turby, this wind ‘bubble’ that exists overtop buildings only interferes with
Turby function in buildings greater than 80 metres tall.  Therefore, these buildings will not be
considered.
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Figure 3.  An air ‘bubble’ forms over the top of a typical building.
The Turby’s tower allows it to escape the turbulent area for buildings
of 80 m in height or less53 (Image source: www.windpower.org).
In addition to the building bubble, Turbys create a wind ‘wake’ of their own.  Turbys must
be placed at least three diameters from each other or six metres in any direction50.  This has
consequences for the maximum number of Turbys that can be placed on any given roof.
THE PROBLEM FORMULATION
Three Questions  
The preceding text has surveyed the problems associated with electricity generation and
delivery today, it has also outlined the DG solution and clean DG in particular.  While there are
many technologies that can be used for DG, and many forms that DG might take as it develops in
the future, the issues surrounding wind-based DG are to be examined in this work.  As one type of
clean DG, wind-based DG is apparently under-investigated, at least in the Canadian context.  Here
it will be considered in the specific context of the commercial buildings of a single city (Toronto,
Ontario, Canada) and using a single type of wind turbine (the rooftop Turby).  
There is no one problem, or single central question, that can be satisfactorily identified for
this work. Instead, three inseparable, interrelated questions emerge as most prominent and
encompassing with respect to the overall issue of Turby realization.
In this specific location, using this specific technology, these three interrelated questions
are as follows:
1.  To what extent, approximately, could this solution help towards
a.  mitigating emissions,
b.  meeting new electricity demand, and
c.  increasing individual consumer electricity independence?
2.  What barriers are some of the most significant in making this solution feasible?
(Barriers include physical, technological, socioeconomic, and market barriers)
3.  What are some policies that can be put in place in order to facilitate the actualization of
this solution?
(Assuming the Turby strategy is deemed desirable by influential actors)
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It must be noted at this point, especially as it pertains to the first question , that while
attempts have been made to ground the exploration in actual numbers and a realistic context, the
exploration is necessarily preliminary and indefinite.  That is, a thorough and more precise
determination of the degree to which this particular solution might help in addressing electricity
related problems is beyond the time frame, scope and budget of this project.  Instead, using some
actual numbers, some simplifying assumptions, and some rudimentary equations, this project
attempts to determine a “ballpark” range of figures, simply for the purposes of identifying  the most
pertinent issues for policymakers wishing to further understand, and perhaps foster, this one
possible solution.
Answering Question One
Data Acquisition.  The most accurate way to determine the extent to which a wind-based
DG solution using the Turby could help towards alleviating electricity associated problems in
Toronto would be to perform a completely thorough wind measurement on all the roofs in the city,
as the myriad of ways that wind flow can be altered as it makes its way around the city’s buildings
severely limits the accuracy of any mathematical modelling exercise without extensive data and
highly complex models.  Here, however, a s imple exercise will nonetheless take place, in full
awareness of its inaccuracy, but with the goal of generating a range of numbers serving the purpose
of informing discussion of the various possibilities.
In this spirit, data was acquired from the City of Toronto’s Municipal Property Assessment
Corporation (MPAC) as to the number, estimated heights, and estimated roof surface area of
commercial buildings within the city54.  The data created was of commercial buildings categorized
as: Commercial Condos Hotels/Motels, Office Buildings, Retail, and Shopping Centres.
Wind data was acquired from three sources. The Ministry of Environment of the
Government of Ontario provided a decade’s worth of data (beginning 1991 to end 2000) at four
weather towers perched throughout the city55.  For this analysis, the 12 metre tower in Scarborough,
and the 10 and 30 metre towers in Etobicoke, were used.  Scarborough, immediately east of the
downtown core and Etobicoke, immediately west, are the names of cities that have now been
amalgamated into the greater city of Toronto.  Wind data was also garnered from the Pearson
International Airport just northwest of Toronto, for the 1967-1976 period, as publically available
through the federal government56, and the other, smaller airports in Toronto through Zephyr North
Consultants57.
Wind Capacity, Power and Costs.  In order to determine the range of possibilities, three
scenarios where developed. 
The ‘Higher Range Scenario’ was an attempt to determine the upper limit of possibilities
in terms of wind potential, power and associated costs.  It assumed that a maximum number of
Turbys could be packed on rooftops and that these would generate electricity at the maximum level
(3 kilowatts per Turby) throughout the entire year.  In so doing, determining power output requires
no wind data input and no building height input.  Determining capacity, power and costs was a thus
matter of finding the maximum number of Turbys that could be placed throughout the city on
commercial buildings, estimating a range of Turby prices that might result and including the
number of hours in a year in calculations.  This was done by using the estimated average roof area
provided by MPAC and by assuming all buildings roofs were square before placing the Turbys in
a geometry that maximized the number of Turbys while still spacing them at 6 metres apart in any
direction.  As the maximum number of Turbys in this scenario is quite large, three prices were
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assumed: 1) the present price of C$15,700, 2) a reduction in price of 10 fold with mass production,
and 3) a reduction in price of 100 fold with mass production.  Costs are also spread out, in a simple
fashion, over the 20 years of the manufacturer’s guarantee.  Again, it is worth restating that this
scenario is not intended to be realistic.  It is simply a distortion of some key variables in order to
see their effects on the key ‘bottom lines’ of capacity, power and costs.
A ‘Mid Range Scenario’ offers a somewhat more complicated picture.  In this scenario, an
attempt at using the wind data is incorporated.  By coincidence, the wind data from within the city
comes from towers having the same heights as four of the five building categories here, at least
when the Turby tower heights are included.  Using the data from these towers, located on either
side of the city core, gives somewhat of a better idea of possible wind levels within the city but
does not pretend to be accurate and does not speak to the range of wind levels that might exist on
rooftops of various heights throughout the city.  The average height of the fifth category of
buildings, hotels and motels, is higher at 40 metres.  There is not a conveniently a comparable
tower as with the other categories of buildings.  Therefore, the wind data at the airports was used,
in combination with the Weibull distribution and the wind shear formula which allows for an
estimation of speeds at 40 metres.  The wind shear formula does not strictly apply to cities, it is
used for comparably open and flat fields, and so it was adjusted by the results of the towers in the
city.  That is, the difference between what the formula predicts should be seen at the towers and
what is actually seen can be used as a rough factor to modify the theoretical results found for 40
metres.  In addition , the wind direction  was considered to be a non-issue with the vertical-axis
turbine, and wind density was not considered.  A range of prices was put forth, and the number of
Turbys was arrived at by simply taking the total estimated area of all the roofs of each building type
and dividing by 144 metres squared.  
The lowest-case scenario would of course be one where no Turbys are bought or installed.
However, here the ‘Lower Range Scenario’ assumed a comparatively warm response to the
technology.  An average of one Turby per commercial building was used in combination with the
same wind regimes as determined in the mid range scenario.  However, in this case, it was assumed
that a comparatively low reduction in costs per Turby of 20% from the present cost was found.  
Greenhouse Gas Reduction.  The most up to date data on Ontarian GHG emissions per
sector tallies up to the end of 2001 and was recently released by Environment Canada58.  Taking
this data, the data on the total amount of terrawattAhours consumed in Ontario annually59, and
assuming that new generation would otherwise come from the same mix of sources as presently
seen, a figure for emissions of potential future GHG emissions prevented, in kilotonnes of CO2
equivalent, was derived for the three Turby scenarios.  Figures are likely an underestimate of what
emissions would be prevented as new generation is likely to be much more coal and gas intensive
due to the closing and poor functioning of nuclear reactors in Ontario6.  Cost per tonne is then
calculated.
Meeting Demand Growth.  Using figures and data already calculated or acquired, the
fraction of growth in demand that could be met by Turbys will be calculated for the three scenarios
under the assumptions of 1.1 per cent growth and 2.2 per cent growth.
Increasing Electricity Independence.  According to a government publication, the average
annual electricity use is 193 kWh/m 2 for commercial buildings in Canada60.  Combining this with
the Toronto commercial building data provided by MPAC and the three scenarios arrived at above,
an estimation is made as to whether the Turbys would be enough to provide all needed power for
the average commercial building in the city.
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Answering Question Two
Using a conceptual framework put forth by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC)15, a discussion of the physical, technological, socioeconomic, and market
barriers is undertaken.  The barriers identified will serve as a way of informing policy decisions.
These will be identified in general terms but grounded in examples from the context under
investigation here.  They will include assessments of some of the physical and economic issues
arising in question one, public opinion surveys, vested interests and cultural norms, and introduce
the concept of experience curves.    
Answering Question Three
A set of policy recommendations will be developed, based on the assumption that urban
wind-based DG is ultimately a desirable thing to foster.  This last assumption is not necessarily the
opinion of the author.  It is constructed simply with the aim of illuminating which actions might
best actualize this one possible electricity solution.  Policy recommendations will be based on a
review of actions taken by relevant governments in Canada to date, and of some programs in other
major developed nations (Japan, Germany, and the US) to foster rooftop clean DG in the form of
solar PV panels in order to gain insights from their policy actions.  There will also be an overview
of the various types of policy instruments that can be used more generally including which will
address their advantages and disadvantages.
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CHAPTER 2 – TO WHAT EXTENT COULD THIS SOLUTION HELP?
Overview
A discussion of the results themselves is entered into here.  A full interpretation, however,
will be undertaken in the following chapters as they pertain to the discussion on barriers and the
discussion of possible supportive policy strategies.
Results of Physical and Cost Estimations
The key figures on commercial properties in Toronto as provided by MPAC can be seen in
Table 1.  There are almost 23,000 commercial buildings in the city and an estimated 11 square
kilometres of surface area on their combined roofs.  Unfortunately, standard deviations on the
averages were not provided, nor was any other information about how buildings parameters, such
as height and surface area, are distributed in a graphical sense.  The data was acquired as a special
request and the exact procedure  used to arrive at the figures is not known, although it did involve
searching through a computer database on property statistics in the city.  
Table 2 displays the results of the High Range Scenario for Turby proliferation and
incorporation into the city’s electricity system.  The most notable figures are those of the cost per
kilowattAhour.  These show the electrical power that could be generated in this scenario as costing
between 6/100ths of a cent to about 6.9 cents per kilowattAhour.  The maximum power generation
figure of 8.198 terawattAhours is estimated to be just over 5% of the entire province’s electricity use.
The following two tables, Tables 3 and 4, show the mid and lower range scenarios
respectively.  The price per kilowattAhour ranges from a very low priced Turby (at C$157) giving
about 4.7 cents per kilowattAhour in the mid range scenario to the high priced Turby (at full present
cost) in the lower range scenario producing electricity at about C$5.80 per kilowattAhour.
It is vital to note that these costs do not include inevitably associated costs such as
installation fees, and accessory equipment.  Further to this, internal organizational transaction costs
such as the time required for decision making, the possible hiring of a consultant, or the like are not
factored into the calculations.  Of course, a major alteration to the price estimates could also be
made in calculating the interest rate effect on loans should companies not pay the entire costs of
Turbys upfront.  The numbers arrived at in the three scenarios assumed a 20-year loan, paid
monthly at an annual interest rate of 10%.  Depending on the many different loan arrangements that
any company might choose or be able to negotiate with a bank (Table 5), the actual costs of the
Turbys themselves would be slightly cheaper to much more expensive.  A 20-year loan on a Turby
of C$15,730 at a 15% annual interest rate, paid in monthly installments, would see the overall cost
of the Turby to be about C$49 thousand over the period.  This makes the price per kWh of the
electricity from averaged out over the 20 year period to C$1.89/kWh in the higher scenario of
Turby proliferation.  A full price Turby in the low range scenario, paid for over 20 years in monthly
installments results in an average electricity price of C$158/kWh over the entire loan period.
Another perspective on the figures could be taken however.  As can be seen in Table 5, the
monthly payments, under all scenarios, are within the budgets of many, if not most, companies.
That is, while the electricity from the Turby might be expensive relative to electricity from the grid,
it might not be expensive to the company in the sense that it would significantly alter their budget
planning or require notable sacrifices.  A C$207 payment per month is within the range of a “petty
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cash” account, for example, in many companies.  In a similar vein, many companies might be able
pay for shorter term loans with higher monthly installments where the overall payment is lower,
and therefore pay electricity prices closer to those seen in Tables 2 through 4.  The 1 year loan
column of Table 5, for example, shows that the overall payment level is only about C$1300-1400
more thus adding comparatively little to the costs over 20 years, as seen in the high through low
scenarios in previous tables.  
It is also important to note that the Turby would, in all likelihood, be used for more than
20 years.  The 20 year figure was chosen because of manufacturer claims that the Turby would be
maintenance free in that period.  The actual costs experienced by any given company will be
affected by the balance of maintenance costs, should they occur, and the time of continued use past
20 years.  Having said this, should Turbys proliferate as a technology or the concept of rooftop
wind-based DG become popular, it is likely that better and cheaper turbines would be available
within 20 years and their costs, power and other attributes will also affect future maintenance and
purchasing decisions.
How much would the Turby strategy help reduced greenhouse gas emissions?  Assuming
that new generation would otherwise come from the same mix of generating technologies that
exists at present, Table 6 shows that between 2 and about 2,200 kilotonnes of CO2 equivalent would
be avoided depending on the scenario.  This is between 0.001% and 1.09% of total emissions in
the province in 2001.  It should be noted however, that the new generation mix will likely shift to
an increased proportion of gas and coal as nuclear plants decom mission.  As no new publically
supported hydro projects are seen in the mid-term future, and centrally generated new renewable
projects known to the author will not significantly alter the electricity generation mix, all GHG
reduction possibilities are likely to be slightly understated.
Assuming national commercial building averages to hold true in Toronto, Table 7 shows
that only in the high range scenario, could a typical commercial building derive all of its electricity
needs from rooftop Turbys.  However, in this scenario, over three times the electricity needed could
be supplied.  The mid and lower scenarios show only 1 .4% and 0.34% of electricity needs being
met, respectively.
Finally, Table 8 depicts the fraction of new demand over the province that might be met in
this fashion between the two ends of the growth in electricity demand projections of 1.1% and 2.2%
per year.  The Turby solution could meet the equivalent of between 0.22% and about 410% of new
demand.  These are, of course, arguably misnamed figures.   Many might say that it doesn’t really
make sense to call it fraction of new demand but it would introduce the equivalent amount of new
electricity power that is likely to be necessary for the upcoming year(s).  In both Table 7 and 8 the
2.5 kW figures were used and not the 3 kW.
It is important to place importance of the dramatic effect that a lack of spread (standard
deviation) information has on these numbers.  As wind power increases with the cube of wind speed
and height has a significant effect on wind speed, the overall effect of speed and height distributions
on the data can be significant.  Similarly, not including temperature or wind density variables in
a geographical region such as Toronto, which experiences a temperature range in the neighbourhood
of 50 to 60 degrees Celsius throughout the year also throws off the accuracy.  Not only do these
omissions greatly reduce the accuracy but they might overlook the possibility of niches in which
the Turby would be quite well-suited.  That is, it is possible that at certain heights, during certain
periods of the year, and in certain areas of the city, the wind levels and speeds would be nicely
suited for Turby electricity generation at a reasonable cost.  The information on which the
estimation below is based does not allow for the uncovering and examining of such niches. 
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Table 1. 
Building Numbers
Total number
of Buildings
Estimated
Number of
Stories
Estimated
Average
Heigt
(feet)
Estimated
Average Heigt
(metres)
Including Heigt
of Turby 
(small tower)
Including Height of
Turby 
(tall tower)
Estimated
Average Roof
Area
(ft2)
Commercial Condos 3382 1 12 3.66 7.33 9.83 1157
Hotels/Motels 380 10 120 36.57 40.25 42.75 4928
Office Buildings 2089 8 96 29.26 32.94 35.44 12000
Retail 16264 2 24 7.32 10.99 13.49 3850
Shopping Centres 874 1.6 25.6 7.80 11.48 13.98 29299
Totals 22989 55.52 16.92 20.60 23.10
Estimated
Average
Area 
(m2)
Estimated
Total Area
(m2)
MPAC data in grey
Commercial Condos 107.49 363527 Calculated numbers in navy blue
Hotels/Motels 457.83 173973
Office Buildings 1114.84 2328893
Retail 357.68 5817253 (km2)
Shopping Centres 2721.97 2378998 11.06
11062646
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Table 2.
High Range Scenario
All Costs in C$ Maximum Number
of  Turbys
Rated Capacity Max Capacity
(2.5 kW) ( 3 kW) Assumptions:
Commercial
Condos
13,528 33,820 40,584
Hotels/Motels 6,080 15,200 18,240 - Max wind speed for 100% of the year, all sites
Office Buildings 75,204 188,010 225,612 - Therefore 2.5 or 3 kWh, per hour
Retail 146,376 365,940 439,128  - Costs fall 100 times with mass production
Shopping
Centres
70,794 176,985 212,382  - All buildings perfectly square (from above)
Total 311,982 779,955 935,946  - 36 Turbys per roof on Office Buildings
 - 81 Turbys per roof on Shopping Centres
Max kWh 6,832,405,800 8,198,886,960  - 4 Turbys per roof on Commercial Condos
- 9 Turbys per roof on Retail Buildings
Turby Costs
Electricity Costs
 - 16 Turbys per roof for Hotels/Motels
Cost per kW Cost per kW  - 20 years of use, costs paid monthly over 20
years, 10% annual interest rate (see Fig. 5)
At
C$15700/Turby
11,365,816,242 14572 12143.7
At
C$1570/Turby
1,136,581,624 1457 1214.3
At
C$157/Turby
113,561,448 145 121.33
Cost per kWh Cost per kWh
At
C$15700/Turby
11,365,816,242 0.0832 0.0693
At
C$1570/Turby
1,136,581,624 0.0083 0.0069
At
C$157/Turby
113,561,448 0.00083 0.0007
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Table 3.
Mid Range Scenario
Assumptions:
All Costs in C$ Max # Turbys Capacity Power  - combined area of all buildings used
        # of Turbys = total area divided by 144m2 per     
                                TurbykW kWh
Commercial
Condos
2,524 953.8 425,328  - this amounts to about:
Hotels/Motels 1,208 306.6 1,048,893        - 6 Turbys per roof on Office Buildings
       - 9 Turbys per roof on Shopping Centres
       - 2 Turbys per roof on Commercial Condos
       - 3 Turbys per roof on Retail Buildings
       - 4 Turbys per roof on Hotels/Motels
Office Buildings 16,173 8,847.4 18,352,149
Retail 40,398 15,262.3 6,806,207
Shopping
Centres
16,521 6,241.6 2,783,436
Total 76,824 31,611.6 29,416,013
 - Commercial condos  
       - use taller tower
       - ave of 10m Etob. & 12m Scar. towers
Total Cost Cost per kW Cost per kWh
At
C$15700/Turby
2,798,772,837 88,563 4.7572  - Office Buildings
At
C$1570/Turby
279,869,601 8,853 0.4757        - use shorter tower
       - same wind as 30 m Etobicoke Tower
At
C$157/Turby
27,963,913 884 0.0475
 - Shopping Centres
       - use shorter tower
       - ave of 10m Etobicoke & 12m Scarborough        
            towers
 - Hotels/Motels
       - use small tower
       - wind shear formula adjusted for airport/city 
          wind speed difference
 - Costs of Turby fall 10 times with mass production
 - 20 years of use, costs paid monthly over 20 years,
10% annual interest rate (see Fig. 5)
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Table 4.
Lower Range Scenario
Assumptions:
All Costs in C$ Max # Turbys Capacity Power  - All buildings perfectly square (from above)
kW kWh  - Ave of 1 Turby per roof on Office Buildings
Commercial Condos 3,382 1,277.7 569,801  - Ave of 1 Turby per roof on Shopping Centres
Hotels/Motels 380 410.7 1,405,175  - Ave of 1 Turby per roof on Commercial Condos
Office Buildings 2,089 1,142.8 2,370,491  - Ave of 1 Turby per roof on Retail Buildings
Retail 16,264 6,144.6 2,740,167  - Ave of 1 Turby per roof on Hotels/Motels
Shopping Centres 874 330.2 147,252  - 20 years of use, costs paid upfront
Total 22,989 9,306.0 7,232,886  - Costs per Turby fall 20% with mass production
 - wind regimes as in mid range scenario
- 20 years of use, costs paid monthly over 20 years,
10% annual interest rate (see Fig. 5)
Total Cost Cost per kW Cost per
kWh
At C$15700/Turby 837,512,259 89,886 5.7896
At C$12560/Turby 670,014,405 71,997 4.6317
At C$1570/Turby 83,702,949 8,994 0.5786
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Table 5.  Interest rate calculations under different assumptions.
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Table 6.
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation
Total Electricity associated emisssions in Ontario in 2001 = 40,900 kilotonnes of CO2 equivalent
which is 25.09  % of Ontario's total emissions
( from: http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/ontario_2001_e.cfm )
In 1999 approximately 140 TWh of electricity was consumed in Ontario
                                 ( from: http://www2.nrcan.gc.ca/es/ener2000/ )
Assuming 1.5% increase per year this means approx 146.39 TWh were consumed in Ontario in 2001
Therefore, for every TWh about 279.38 kilotonnes of CO2 equivalent are released in Ontario
or 2.79 x10-7 kilotonnes of CO2 equivalent per kWh are released in Ontario
Assuming new production would occur from the same generation mix as seen today in Ontario:
High Range Scenario 6,832,405,800 kWh are created so 1,909 kilotonnes of CO2 eq are not released
or 8,198,886,960 kWh are created so 2,291 kilotonnes of CO2 eq are not released
Mid Range Scenario 29,416,014 kWh are created so 8 kilotonnes of CO2 eq are not released
Lower Range Scenario 7,232,886 kWh are created so 2 kilotonnes of CO2 eq are not released
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Table 7.
    Energy Independence
If the average commercial building in Canada uses 193 kWh/m2 annually,
and the average commercial building in Toronto is 481.2 m2,
then the average commercial building in Toronto uses 92,871.60 kWh of electricity annually.
High Scenario Total # Rated Capac ity Generation
in Toronto (kilowatts) (kWh)
Commercial
Condos
3,382 33,820 296,263,200
Hotels/Motels 380 15,200 133,152,000
Office
Buildings
2,089 188,010 1,646,967,600
Retail 16,264 365,940 3,205,634,400
Shopping
Centres
874 176,985 1,550,388,600 kWh per Building
Total 22,989 779,955 6.83 x 109 297,203.3 (320%)
Mid Scenario Total # Generation
in Toronto (kWh)
Commercial
Condos
3,382 425,328.1
Hotels/Motels 380 1,048,893.1
Office
Buildings
2,089 18,352,149.1
Retail 16,264 6,806,207.3
Shopping
Centres
874 2,783,436.4 kWh per Building
Total 22,989 29,416,013.9 1,279.6 (1.4%)
Low Scenario Total # Generation
in Toronto (kWh)
Commercial
Condos
3,382 569,801.1
Hotels/Motels 380 1,405,175.0
Office
Buildings
2,089 2,370,490.7
Retail 16,264 2,740,166.9
Shopping
Centres
874 147,252.0 kWh per Building
Total 22,989 7,232,885.5 314.6 (0.34%)
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Table 8.
     Fraction of New Generation 
Present Generation Estimate (TWh)
150.81
Assuming 1.1% growth in Demand
1.66 TWh needed
High Scenario  = 6,832,405,800 / 1,658,961,015 x 100 % of new demand
 = 411.85  % of new demand
Mid Scenario  = 29,416,014/1,658,961 x 100% of new demand
 = 1.77  % of new demand
Low Scenario  = 7,233,886 / 1,658,961 x 100% of new demand
 = 0.44  % of new demand
Assuming 2.2% growth in demand
3.32 TWh needed
High Scenario  = 200.85  % of new demand
Mid Scenario  = 0.89  % of new demand
Low Scenario  = 0.22  % of new demand
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CHAPTER 3 – WHAT ARE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS TO TURBYS?
A Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework used here in which to place the Turby and its potential progress
toward increased market penetration into the context of the city of Toronto is the one used by the
United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)1.  In the IPCC’s 2001 ‘Third
Assessment Report’ on climate change, a barrier to any given technology was defined as “any
obstacle to reaching a potential that can be overcome by a policy, programme, or measure.”  There
are different types of barriers and these prevent technologies or practices from reaching different
types of potentials (Figure 1).
Figure 1.  Penetration of environmentally sound technologies: a conceptual framework1.
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As the IPCC is a body of experts reviewing the climate change literature, the vertical axis
of the diagram in figure 1 refers to ‘Mitigation potential’, or the potential to reduce GHG emission
rates.  However, the concept of barriers can be applied in the same general fashion toward the
attainment of other potentials, such as individual energy independence, as well.  The more general
concept sees a technology as having an upper limit of market penetration determined by its physical
ability to help on any dimension, be it mitigation potential, independence or what have you, and
its numbers.  This is called the ‘Technical potential’.  Significantly below this is the presently
achieved level of uptake in practice or what the market has allowed to date.  This is called the
‘Market potential’.  The difference between the achieved penetration, or the market potential, of
a technology and the upper, technical potential is seen in this model as a result of various barriers
of different types.  These barriers are categorized, but only loosely so.  That is, the lines between
the categories are not strictly defined such that the categories gradually blend into each other. 
Starting at the bottom of the figure  are the economic barriers.  These are often termed
‘market failures’ elsewhere.  These have to do with the inherent limitations of the market and
existing governmental policies or institutions that inhibit the uptake and diffusion of a technology
that is, or would be, cost-effective to users regardless of its other social or environmental benefits.
Reaching the ‘Economic potential’, as seen in the figure, would thus occur if there was full uptake
by the market of technologies that are cost-effective, but only from the individual consumer’s point
of view.  This includes private rate of time discounting and consumer preference with respect to
acceptability of other performance attributes of the technology.  There are many examples of such
economic barriers.  Information flow about the new technologies, from marketing to word-of-
mouth, can be poor for a host of reasons.  Misplaced incentives can exist.  These result between
landlords and tenants when the tenant is responsible for the monthly cost of electricity, for example,
and the landlord is prone to provide the equipment with the cheapest upfront cost without regard
to its long-term monthly energy use.  There could be biassed competition rules and unfair trade
rules.  There can be network barriers.  That is, the development of a network of related or even
required complementary technologies is not adequate.  Inconsistent and inequitable subsidies can
favour some technologies over others.  Financial institutions also have their biases that affect which
projects get financing.  For example, environmentally sound technologies with relatively small
project sizes, long repayment periods and high upfront transaction costs are less appealing to banks.
Even if market and institutional barriers are removed, some environmentally friendly
technologies might not reach their full technical potential because people do not like them, some
are too poor to afford them, or because existing social and cultural forces operate against their
acceptance.  Should these be overcome, then the ‘Socioeconomic potential’ could be met.
Examples of these kinds of barriers include soc ial norms, individual habits and values, and the
actions of parties whose vested interests cause them to undertake a range of actions that prevent the
large-scale adoption of  technologies which threaten their interests.  One such type of action by
vested interests would be to lobby against and prevent the inception of government policies
attempting to internalize external costs.  That is, most often, environmental and social costs that
result from the individual’s use of any given technology are not internalized by way of any of a
number of possible governmental policies.  The presence or absence of such internalization policies
can serve as a barrier or facilitator to any given technology.
The technical potential can only be reached when all the previous barriers have been
removed or hurdled and remaining costs to the consumer of the technology can be reduced.  That
is, the remaining barriers have to do with the development of the physical design of the technology
35
itself and its expense to even the richest of consumers.
The horizontal dashed line further to the technical potential, at the very top of the figure,
is the physical potential from which any technology draws.  For example, in the case of urban wind
turbines, the physical potential is the total energy that can be found in the wind that flows around
any given city throughout the year.  Even if they were incorporated into the market to their
maximum numbers, different technologies are better or less able to approach the overall physical
potential.
Economic Barriers to the Turby in Toronto
Consumer Awareness.  According to market theory, in order for the market to properly
function, information must be widely available to the consumer about the full range of existing
options available to meet needs or demands.  The lack of information on any given product acts as
a barrier to its market penetration in this sense as consumer decisions will be made in ignorance of
that product and thus preclude it from being able to compete.  
It is safe to assert that the Turby is not a well-known product in Canada.  To the author’s
knowledge, there has been mention of it in an electronic newsletter of a prominent Canadian
environmental group2, a renewable energy newsletter of a branch of the International Energy
Agency3, and one piece done by the Associated Press4.   No person in Canada or elsewhere
encountered in the process of this work, let alone any wind energy expert, has admitted knowledge
of the existence of the Turby turbine.
The company producing the Turby, Core International, is based in the Netherlands and
presently consists of three people.  The budget is minimal compared to even central generation
wind power companies, let alone gas and coal companies.  Advertising, promotion and awareness
will be slow to take off for the near future and certainly will not be focussed on Canada, let alone
Toronto.
The issue of awareness is particularly pertinent as the product is one that must be taken up
by the general public and not simply bought by utilities, large institutions or governments.  That
is, promotion and awareness generation is even more expensive because it must be diffusely done
and not targeted at key buyers.
In contrast, established parties promoting traditional technologies for central generation are
able to focus largely on governments, utilities, and suppliers.  They have established products that
are well known to the buyers and have significant budgets and social and political experience from
which to draw in order to influence buyers.
Price.  As shown in the tables of chapter two, there is a range of possible prices of the
electricity coming from Turbys.  At the moment, The Turby definitely needs price help or it will
be ‘locked-out’ of the market (see chapter four).  That is, lower prices would greatly increase the
number of Turbys that will sell, but greatly increasing the number of Turbys sold is needed in order
to help lower the price.
The price of electricity in Ontario for consumers using less  than 250,000 kilowattAhours
annually, which is above the average commercial building consumption as seen in Table 7 of
chapter 2, is fixed at C$0.043 per kilowattAhour5.  This will remain so until 2006.  Therefore, for
those consumers making decisions solely based on best available price, only a very cheaply priced
Turby of about C$314 in the mid-range scenario of market uptake (ie. twice the lowest price seen
there) or the high range scenario uptake prices are possibly competitive in this respect.
Having noted this, the prices seen in the tables of chapter two are of course underestimates
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in all situations in that accessory technologies such as storage devices or grid interface technologies,
installation labour, maintenance problems and more will increase the overall price per unit of
electrical power. While no Turby installation permit fee exists as yet, satellite dishes, radio towers
and solar collectors are charged a C$288.75 permit fee per installed structure by the municipal
government of Toronto and there is an overall C$84 processing fee6.
Investment Risk.  The price issue is further complicated by the fact that a technology such
as the Turby will in all likelihood undergo further improvements over time.  Should these
improvements be sign ificant, and this is likely the case with the Turby, then the investment in the
Turby becomes less attractive in the present as cheaper, more powerful, lighter or more quiet
Turbys might avail themselves within the lifetime of a purchase of a Turby of today.  Thus, Turbys
will become a more attractive long-term investment as the technology continues to mature.  This
will be further addressed below in the context of technical barriers. Not only will investment risk
be high but projects will be small, applied for by small customers with potentially high risk credit
profiles, further rendering possible financing less attractive to banks.  In contrast, a single natural
gas plant for central generation is a sizeable project which might generate good returns for the bank,
is a proven and more mature technology, done with clients who likely have more solid financial
backing and might even be publically secured.
Misplaced Incentives.   Should a company wish to buy a Turby for reasons other than price,
but is leasing a space in a commercial building, it might arise that the landlord would not be
willing to accommodate the company’s wish as it might not be to the landlord’s economic
advantage.  This is a significant barrier.  Most commercial buildings in Toronto are owned by a
relatively small number of landlords who lease space to commercial tenants.  Unless they feel that
their properties gain value through the acquisition of Turbys, they are apt to be strongly against
their installation.  Even if, for example, all the companies in a given building were getting all their
electricity from Turbys the landlord might still be stuck with paying the baseline electricity fees.
If these are turned over to the tenants, it effectively raises the price of the Turbys.  
Network Barriers.  The Turby might not be as attractive today as it could be in the future
should a network of related technologies develop.  Chief amongst these is likely the stationary
hydrogen fuel cell.  One vision of an energy future that has been held up by some is the stationary
fuel cell as the cornerstone of a hydrogen-based society6.  The idea generally seems to be that the
fuel cell could play the multiple roles of energy storage, electricity provider, heat provider and
hydrogen provider (Figure 2).  That is, if a fuel cell is placed in a residential or commercial
building, it could take the electricity from power sources, such as Turbys, use this to split water
into hydrogen, use the heat that is released from such a reaction to help heat the building, store the
hydrogen for vehicle use and/or recombine it with oxygen from the air to form water and electricity
again.  At the moment this is a seemingly distant, though clearly not an unrealistic possibility.  
A Turby might also be more attractive if electricity needs were to be reduced and a smaller
number of turbines could meet a company’s entire electricity needs.  This could occur, for example,
through the development of more efficient appliances, lighting, electrical machines and so forth.
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Figure 2.  A Hydrogen House7.  One vision of energy system future involves the
hydrogen fuel cell as its centrepiece.  A source of electricity is required.  In this picture,
rooftop solar panels are envisioned.  A rooftop wind turbine might also be a possibility
for urban buildings.
Inequitable Subsidies.  Historically governments worldwide have directly supported
conventional energy at many times the level of subsidy than alternatives.  Global estimates of direct
subsidy of conventional sources of energy in the 1990s range between US$250-350 billion
annually8,9,10,11,12.  When indirect forms of subsidy are considered such as state supply quotas, low-
cost or underwritten loans, limits to liabilities, preferential tax treatment, related healthcare costs
and military defence of oil excavation and transport, the estimates increase significantly7.  A report
by a renewable energy task force panel of the group of eight of the world’s most prosperous nations
(the G8) claims that these figures are declining globally13, and the Canadian government’s official
position is that they are now negligible in Canada, although environmental and renewable energy
groups disagree with these claims or assert that the rate of decline is not fast enough.
Competition from other DG.  Businesses or organizations that might wish to be electricity
independent can choose from the entire range of DG technologies.  If they wish to choose a clean
DG technology the main competition for Turbys in the city is solar PV.  Solar PV could possibly
co-exist with rooftop turbines as shade might be minimal, but at the present the prices of both
require a choice of purchasing one of the other.
Socioeconomic Barriers to the Turby in Toronto
Consumer Norms.  At the moment at least, a very active, committed and educated
consumer is necessary for Turby proliferation.  In purchasing a Turby there would be a need for at
least a rudimentary wind-assessment on the roof of the building, a placement decision as to where
on the roof Turbys might best be located, a calculation of likely costs over the lifetime, a loan
application and other related financial transactions, a shipping request from the Netherlands which
might involve paperwork and fees for customs, possible internal disputes within a company as to
whether the Turby strategy is aesthetically desirable or worthwhile based on all the issues outlined
in this work, possible municipal noise violations should a large number be purchased and the
location of the building be in a noise sensitive area, and an installation permit fee from the city for
each turbine.  Further to these are maintenance and repair issues should they arise and of course any
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decisions on grid versus storage backup.  Both of the latter involve further knowledge and purchases
of accessory technologies.  Many of these issues could be handled by a distributor or energy service
company but this would further increase the price by adding a third party or ‘middleman’.
In most other provinces of Canada, the alternative is often to just place a telephone call to
the single, monopolistic, government-owned electricity utility and begin to pay for electricity
coming through lines that are already connected to the building.  In Ontario, there are a number of
suppliers with the advent of increased deregulation (see next chapter) but even sorting through
these, as a consumer, is comparatively easy.  
The cultural norm in Canada is to not only spend little time and effort acquiring electricity,
but to think very little about its associated source and delivery issues as identified in the first
chapter.  Perhaps the most telling sign of this ignorance and disconnect can be seen in a key term
used by Ontarians.  Ontario generates just more than 25% of its electricity from hydroelectric
sources, but most people call their electricity bill a “hydro bill.”  It is even referred to as this in
provincial government web sites and speeches by politicians.  Similarly, prior to efforts at
deregulation, Ontario’s monopolistic utility was called “Ontario Hydro.”  It has since been broken
apart into separate companies with more specialized mandates.  Interestingly, calling all that is
electric ‘hydro’ carried through to an extent upon increased deregulation.  One of the newly created
spinoffs is now called “Hydro One,” for example, despite the fact that it is primarily an electricity
delivery (transmission and distribution) company.
It is perhaps not surprising then, even in discussions of the barriers to more established DG
technologies, that an office or company ‘champion’ or lead enthusiast who takes on the
responsibility of educating others and seeing the project through, is often identified as key to the
incorporation of the new technology in a company14.  In a similar vein, the interest in the
Netherlands to date is strongest in consulting companies and other companies wishing to see
themselves as environmentally progressive and ‘out of the box’ thinkers more generally15.
Legislative Barriers.  Legislative barriers are a good example of barriers that are
particularly hard to classify as simply social or simply economic, in that they are a result of
political processes.  Legislative barriers can be numerous and range from international trade
regulations, through tax laws, building codes, product safety standards to municipal bi-laws. Some
of the more relevant legislative issues to Turby proliferation surround placement and permit rights
and fees, interconnection standards and processes with the grid, tax incentives for renewable energy
or clean DG more specifically , tax incentives for other related technologies, punitive taxes on
competing technologies, electricity pricing rules, whether or not consumers can sell surplus
electricity that they have generated back to the grid and at what price they will get for it, energy
efficiency standards for buildings, machines and appliances, and whether building codes and
architectural designs might be legislated to include Turby friendly elements into commercial
buildings.  Each of these issues could be discussed at significant length but, as will be seen in the
next chapter, some of these legislative issues are being addressed in Canada and Ontario more
specifically.  The point of this chapter is simply to identify, or acknowledge barriers and not
investigate each in an overly thorough fashion.
Public Tastes.  An important possibility exists that the public might generally not find the
concept nor the aesthetics of rooftop turbines appealing.  As the Turby is a novel and highly
unknown technology, no surveys of public opinion with respect to the Turby itself have been done
in Toronto.  However, surveys and other kinds of assessments have been done in the city for
another, related technology.  
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Recently a number of surveys and other activities were undertaken regarding the opinions
of people in the city and its greater region with respect to a large 750 kilowatt traditional propeller-
type wind turbine that helped in the decision to install it on the city lakeshore16.  Overall, the survey
results revealed very strong support for the lakeshore windmill project. In fact, on the more general
question of the use of wind-generated electricity, significant support is typically shown. Of the
respondents to one survey, 79.5% felt that Ontario power utilities should make the expansion of
wind-generated electricity a priority.  Prior knowledge of wind turbines might have been
influential. Of the respondents, 89.5% indicated they had either heard of (13.3%), seen a picture
of (46.7%) or seen a real turbine (27.62%).  In this same survey, support was expressed for the
siting of wind turbines in the city itself. Of the respondents, 80% revealed that they like the idea
of having wind turbines in the city. More specifically, 82% indicated they had no objection to wind
turbines being put up on the waterfront.  Clearly, according to this survey, there was strong support
not only for the concept of increasing the availability of wind-energy, but also for locating turbines
at these sites on the waterfront.  
In addition to the surveys were public consultations about the wind turbine in different
communities about the city.  This involved attending the meetings of various organizations,
different community events, and taking residents on tours of wind farms that exist outside  of the
city.  All of these helped, but the tours to see other wind turbines in action apparently had a
significant effect.  This finding that respondents are significantly more likely to approve of wind
farms once they have seen them in operation in or near their locality has been seen elsewhere.
Several surveys in the UK, for example, show large leaps in approval from 30-40% approval before
wind turbine installation to 60-85% approval after local installation and operation for one year17.
Familiarizing the Canadian population with wind turbines was, not surprisingly, one of the main
goals of the co-op and private utility that put up the lakeshore turbine.
A large wind turbine in a field near the lake is clearly not the same as a small turbine on top
of a commercial building.  Public enthusiasm might or might not generalize.  Having said this, a
rooftop practice called ‘green roofs’, which is well established in some European countries,
especially Germany, is slowly catching on in Canada.  This would seem to indicate an increased
awareness of possibilities that exist in the underutilised space on roof tops. Green roofs comprise
an alteration of a standard roof to create a contained green space, such as gardens or simply land
cover, in order to improve building insulation, reduce rain water runoff, reduce the urban ‘heat
island’ effect, improve air quality, plant vegetables and fruits, and enhance or create unused
recreational space.  The federal government and the municipal government of Toronto have co-
sponsored some demonstration projects in the city, including one on the roof of the city hall18,19.
Progress on green roofs and rooftop wind turbines might be synergistic.  That is, it is
possible that increased awareness and policy actions to support one might help increase awareness
and policies supporting the other.  Moreover, there is no reason to see why they could not coexist
on roofs.  To date, no surveys have apparently been done on public opinions in Toronto, or even
North America, with respect to green roofs20. 
Vested Interests.  As alluded to above, the Turby is a product that provides electricity
services and these are already provided by a small number of large parties who would not wish
further competition.  Turbys or other clean DG technologies are doubly threatening because they
not only would take away from their electricity sales but they represent a mode of electricity
generation which results in consumer electricity independence and thus could also take away from
the political clout of large utilities and thus the future ability to influence market rules and
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conditions.
It is difficult to find examples of vested interests in Toronto specifically as much of the
actions go on behind the scenes and many actions are very well disguised even if documented.
Generally, however, these parties could possibly engage in any of a wide range of actions that
would result in the increased unlikelihood of market uptake of the Turby in Toronto.  They could,
for example, lobby for or against any regulatory changes, pushing for rules that work in their favour
and not for increased DG or clean DG.  In public speeches, in the press, or at community events
of all kinds they could also downplay alternatives to their products or services.  A good example
of how the process works elsewhere can be seen in recent actions of the ExxonMobil oil company.
The Chief Executive Officer of the company was recently quoted as saying that “even if wind and
solar power experienced rapid growth, they would still account for less than 1% of world energy
consumption by 2020"21.  This is very much on the low end of projections by energy authorities
such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development or the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the US Department of Energy.
The IEA predicts that alternative sources of energy will increase rapidly from the present 0.5% to
about 10% of the total primary energy supply (TPES) by 202022.  The IEA’s definition of renewable
energy does not include hydroelectric power which it projects will supply a further 2.3% of the
TPES by 2020.  The US EIA estimates that renewable energy will only comprise 8 percent of the
TPES by 2020 although the EIA includes hydroelectricity in its definition of renewable energy23.
ExxonMobil also openly supports organizations that lobby against any actions by US or
other national governments on global climate change24,25, many of which came to Canada during
the debate over the ratification of the Kyoto protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate change.  Similarly, ExxonMobil has openly, and successfully, lobbied for the removal
of the now ex-IPCC chair from Harvard University, Dr. Robert Watson26,27.
One could argue that it might be in the interests of utilities to promote energy efficiency and
branch into clean DG projects in a world of increasingly legislated carbon emission constraint.
That is, selling clean DG can not only delay major new generation expenditures by meeting
increased demand in a more modular and appropriate scale, help with public image, and increase
customer loyalty and trust, but selling clean DG technologies such as  the Turby could also help a
utility to obtain carbon offset credits and win contracts should proof of GHG reduction efforts are
required prior to contract granting as occurs in the US state of Oregon7.  In addition, starting with
small scale wind in this fashion might be a comparatively inexpensive and gradual way to
transform the expertise of the utility’s workforce. One approach might therefore be for
manufacturers of the Turby to not fight against the utilities but work with them for these reasons.
The efforts of the company might thus be well-placed in trying to convince a large utility or
institution to become a champion for the technology.  Toronto Hydro already acts as a energy
service company selling solar water heaters made by EnerWorks of London, Ontario28.  However,
solar heaters compete with natural gas and oil, and only minimally with electricity.
Technical Barriers to the Turby in Toronto
Technical barriers include more than just engineering obstacles or other physical design
aspects of the technology itself, although these are the major issues in this category.  Others include
the strength and shape of the buildings themselves, the collective noise of possibly thousands of
Turbys, and the existence of other structures on roofs such as satellite dishes, radio towers,
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ventilation ducts, fire escapes and solar panels.
Experience Curves.  One approach to understanding the reduction of costs in the
production of the turbines themselves might be to use the insights gained from experience curves
research29.  Experience with the production of any product or technology usually results in the
ability to produce the same product at a lower price.  Observations across a wide range of industries
and products find a common, or repeating underlying pattern.  Namely, when the price of that
product or technology is graphed (in constant currency units and on a double logarithmic graph),
against the cumulative sales, straight lines emerge the slopes of which indicate the rate of gain in
experience.  Figure 3 shows the experience curve of wind turbines in Denmark between the years
1982 and 1997.  As can be seen in the figure, centrally generated wind power turbines themselves
had a progress ratio at that time and in that country of 96%.  This means that during this period the
cost of producing a megawatt from large wind turbines lowered by about four percent per year. 
The overall price of electricity from any given technology involves more than just the
generating technology’s production costs of course.  That is, learning takes place in the market in
all the associated activities and technologies involved in the overall process of generating electricity
from different sources.  Figure 4 displays the overall experience curves for the process of generating
electricity from various technologies as seen in the European Union countries between 1980 and
1995.  The 82% experience curve slope for centrally generated wind power in the figure is,
coincidentally, the average learning curve found across different industries.  It is vitally important
to note, however, that one of the most significant reasons wind power costs achieved the 82%
figure was an increase in turbine size.  Turbys will not be able to ‘size-up’ in this fashion.
Not enough data are available for a reasonable estimation of the extent and rate of price
decline for Turbys. However, in general, as shown in the figure four, dramatic declines in prices
can be seen with a an increase in cumulative production of an order or two of magnitude.
Certainly, the high range scenario where over three hundred and ten thousand Turbys would be
required would qualify as such an increase.  This is not to say that the price ranges shown in chapter
two were arrived at systematically using experience curves.  They were simply chosen to show the
degree of price reduction required to make Turbys price competitive given the present lack of
ecological taxation on alternatives and the present policy of electricity price determination.
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Figure 4.  Experience curves for electricity generating technologies in the European Union 1980-199529.
NGCC = Combined Cycle Natural Gas electricity generation.
Figure 3.  Experience curve exclusively for wind turbine production (as opposed to the electricity that
comes from it) in Denmark between 1982 and 1997 (From 29)
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Physical Barriers of Urban Wind in Toronto
At the moment the amount of energy in the wind that flows around the rooftops of Toronto
is more than enough to meet energy needs.  This can be seen in Table 7 of chapter two.  Effectively
the high range scenario presents an as yet uninvented wind turbine that can generate 2.5
kilowattAhours of power or more all the time ( ie. At all existing wind speeds on commercial
building rooftops).  Feasible numbers of these on a roof and commercial needs for a typical building
can be satisfied.  Increase the electrical efficiency of a building and alternately a smaller amount
of power per turbine would be required or a smaller number of turbines would be required.  To
illustrate the potential of efficiency in helping make clean DG more feasible one could look at the
gap between the typical commercial building and already proven and well-studied efficiency
standards and practices.  The average electricity use in commercial buildings is 193 kWh/m 2 of
floor area.  However, the first office building in Canada certified as “C2000” (a commercial energy
efficiency standard of the federal government) uses only 73 kWh/m 2 of floor area30.  This is an
increase in efficiency of over 62% in terms of electricity use.
In this way the physical potential of rooftop wind, or urban wind more generally, in Toronto
might or might not be a concern.  That is, electricity requirements might or might not reach the full
amount of energy that flows around buildings in the city if the balance between efficiency and
growth in demand for energy services from electrical technologies is tilted towards efficiency.
While increases in efficiency have typically offset growth in demand to date in some sections of
the economy, such as in residential electricity demand31, the overall demand for electricity has
continued to grow.  The past, of course, should not be used exclusively when predicting the future.
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CHAPTER 4 – WHAT ARE SOME POLICIES THAT ARE OR COULD BE PUT IN
PLACE IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE ACTUALIZATION OF THIS SOLUTION?
OVERVIEW
This chapter begins with a survey of the relevant political structures, institutions, market
arrangements and government policies at the federal, provincial and municipal levels with respect
to electricity generation in Canada.  This is to say the actions which are fostering the development
and deployment of DG in general in the country and clean DG in particular.  All governments are
aware of the potential and desirability of DG and clean DG in general and recognize the general
direction toward it.  Thus some actions have been taken or are underway which, while clearly not
done with the Turby specifically in mind, are helping to build a basis for its proliferation.
Much more would need to be done, however, should rooftop wind be a serious objective in
Toronto.  The remainder of the chapter consists of an overview of other possible policy options,
with their benefits and drawbacks, including a brief outline of the efforts of other countries to
develop and deploy another clean DG rooftop technology, solar PV panels, in order to gain insights
into existing policy approaches used in face of similar goals and obstacles.               
DG AND CLEAN DG IN CANADA
The Canadian electricity industry is seemingly at an epochal time.  In a recent meeting with
a federal senate committee on energy, the environment and natural resources, the Canadian
Electricity Association (CEA) outlined some of the many challenges it presently faces1.  At present
the industry projects an increase in demand of 35% from 2000 levels by 2020.  This is roughly in
line with projections of the National Energy Board of 1.1% to 1.5% annual growth in demand until
20252.  Projections have been made mostly in anticipation of increased domestic demand, although
export plays a notable role at 7-9% of generation nationally and might increase in proportion
depending on presently ongoing negotiations in and with the US.  That is, a major US initiative is
now taking place in the restructuring of US electricity markets through the formation of Regional
Transmission Organizations, as mandated by the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and
Canadian players are being included3.   Overall, however, this projected growth is to take place not
only under the uncertainty of future US market regulations but also while internal restructuring and
liberalization are occurring, some generating plants are nearing their end, nuclear plants are not
fulfilling their expected lifespan or reliability, and carbon-constraint is being imposed as Canada
has ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
and is committed to a reduction in greenhouse gas emission rates of 6% below its 1990 levels.
As seen in Figure 1 of chapter one, Canada produces approximately 11% of its electricity
in a distributed manner, or slightly above the world average but far less than leaders such as
Denmark.  Certainly, opportunities for DG abound, not only given the demand and political
contexts outlined above but also as significant parts of Canada have populations which are
themselves highly distributed, particularly in regions north of the major population centres.
In Canada electricity is chiefly under provincial jurisdiction, although all levels of
government ultimately create and oversee policies that can affect DG.  All governments at least
acknowledge the trend toward, and potential of, DG but each approach the issue in a unique
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manner.  Most DG in Canada is used to supply electricity and heat to industry (larger scale co-
generation), with pulp and paper being the largest user. The growing heavy oil industry is the
largest growth sector for new industrial gas-based co-generation projects, and some new wind and
small hydro projects are developing.
As a significant aside, there is also movement on energy efficiency, although it might or
might not be perceived in the intellectual context of distributed energy resources.  The CEA claims
that electric utility companies have spent over C$750 million on energy efficiency programs since
1990, and the current forecast for the next 5-10 years shows industry spending will exceed C$1
billion1.   Environmentalists are certainly pushing for this as a primary solution as well4.   Both
would like to see better efforts and regulations to support and foster this distributed resource from
policy makers.
Overview of Governmental Actions To Date
As can be garnered from what follows, a number of policies and actions have been or are
about to be taken in Canada, and in Ontario and Toronto more specifically, that will help the
chances of large scale development and deployment of DG and clean DG such as the Turby.  Chief
amongst these are the efforts at reducing or normalizing grid connection, permitting and other such
barriers through the ‘Micropower Connect’ program, legislation to enable net metering in Ontario,
direct and indirect R&D investment in DG technologies and companies, demonstration project
investments, conference organizing, promotional actions, and the general support of increased
market deregulation.
Other actions certainly will not hurt the chances of increased DG, but might be less effective
than they first appear.  Namely, the tax incentives, while desirable, helpful and important, are more
of an advantage to corporate and wealthy entities and might not help those having trouble with up-
front DG costs, depending on the timing of the tax breaks.  Up-front costs are the most significant
issue, of course, especially for clean DG technologies.  Moreover, the exact definition of
‘alternative or renewable’ sources of energy has as yet not been stipulated for the provincial tax
laws mentioned.  This will be critical to which technologies are supported should the definition be
a limited one.  Similarly, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol increases the likelihood of more DG
and more clean DG but it does not assure it.  The national targets can be met in a wide variety of
ways and it remains to be seen exactly how DG fits into the strategies of the various governments.
Some actions will not help with the development and deployment of DG, let alone clean
DG.  Most significantly is the subsidizing of electricity prices by the government of Ontario in
order to fix the rate at a very low C$0.043 per kilowattAhour for the next few years. Subsidizing
a low price is possibly surprising given that doing so is in dissonance with the present government’s
overtly stated economic ideology.  Regardless, it certainly acts to help entrench the status quo in
the near future with respect to generation options by creating a significant price barrier to many DG
projects.
Despite all these actions, or even because of some of them, much more would need to be
done in order to develop and deploy Turbys in the city, especially if it were wished to make them
a reality in the relatively near future.  Succeeding sections will examine some policy options and
assess their advantages and disadvantages.  
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Actions of the Federal Government
Scope and Approach.  In general, there has been a decrease in interventionist energy policy
federally in Canada over the 1990s, as can be seen in such actions as a decrease in energy taxes over
this time period, changes in pricing rules, easing of export restrictions, elimination of fossil fuel
substitution subsidies, and the relaxing of foreign investment laws and ownership laws more
generally5. This is consistent with its desire to have a market-based approach, fulfill obligations
under continental agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Canada-
US Clean Air Agreement and work within international trade rules more generally6.  The liberal
federal government promotes its energy policy as oriented toward sustainable development since
1993 and seeks to attain this through policies that compensate for market failures.  Thus, its
interventions with respect to energy can largely be classified as the establishing of various
regulations and guidelines, information and promotional programs of various sorts, research and
development that would not be feasible for the private sector, subsidies for developing
technologies, international development aid, government purchasing, and the initiation and
guidance of community development projects. 
Laws and Regulations.  The federal government determines a number of specific policies
which affect DG directly or indirectly.  For example, the National Energy Board regulates
electricity exports and the construction, operation and abandonment of international, and designated
interprovincial power lines.  Companies seeking to either export electricity or to construct and
operate an international power line must first obtain board permission, something that the board
openly admits is not very difficult to secure2.   Ease of connection to the  grid , albeit the lower
voltage grids, is not this easy for those with DG capacity.  
The government has attempted to rectify this situation nationally by organizing and co-
chairing the “MicroPower Connect” group which exists to develop and implement a Canadian
guideline for DG interconnection standards and foster renewable DG. This group has been striving
for a completed national interconnection guideline by early this year.  The group also has annual
meetings, attended by a large number of industry groups, dealing with other technical issues,
regulatory obstacles and business opportunities relating to grid-interconnection of DG7.
Another action directly affecting DG is the inclusion of green technologies from co-
generation and PV systems to electricity generated from flare-gas in the ‘Class 43.1' tax category.
This allows for an accelerated rate of depreciation for tax purposes (30% versus 8% per year for
other electrical devices).  However, equipment must be used directly in connection with an
industrial process to qualify and so the benefits are not extended to other users8.
Natural gas policies indirectly affect the economics of DG electricity for both gas turbines
and fuel cells that generate their hydrogen from natural gas.  The natural gas market is deregulated
in Canada but its transmission pipeline network is government regulated.  In the late 1990s,
pipelines to the US were constructed which reduced the traditional domestic gas surplus,  and thus
the low gas prices Canadians had enjoyed until that point6.   Although electricity prices have also
increased, at least in some regions, the higher the price of gas relative to electricity prices, the less
economical gas turbines and some fuel cells become.
It remains to be seen exactly how other policy decisions will affect DG.  As mentioned, the
government has ratified the Kyoto Protocol and this should serve as a spur to DG as it can
contribute to a lowering of greenhouse gas emission rates.  So far the government has stated that
it wishes to further develop DG and work toward the ‘hydrogen society’.   It asserts it will do so
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using such instruments as innovation and technology investments, infrastructure investments, a
partnership fund, covenants and emissions trading by industry, and different targeted measures9.
The federal government sees DG development as a mid- to long-term process.
Research and Development.  The federal government is committed to more than doubling
gross expenditures on research and development (R&D) from C$21 billion to C$49 billion by 2010,
which will move Canada from 15th to 5th in the world 10.  Private sector R&D is also on the rise.
Included in this are projects that will affect DG.  In addition to this, budget 2003 provides funding
of C$2 billion over five years for climate change measures, including C$250 million for Sustainable
Development Technology Canada (SDTC)11.  The SDTC is a not-for-profit that funds greenhouse
gas emission reduction technologies, with federal government and industry money, at points in their
development that are underfunded12,13.  The list of federal research projects is substantial and only
a sampling is offered here.  
Public Works & Government Services Canada (PWGSC) provided funding this past fiscal
year to investigate the benefits of installing distributed generation technologies in various PWGSC
buildings throughout the country – this after successful application of a microturbine system at the
Health Canada building in Scarborough, Ontario.  PWGSC found the microturbine to be
economical and provide environmental benefits in relation to the reduction of emissions14. 
Industry Canada has established “Technology Partnerships Canada” as a technology
investment fund developing new technology that would not otherwise proceed within the desired
scope or timing of the private sector.  Environmental technologies are part of its funding mandate15.
Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) has funded the National Solar Test Facility which
features a 200-kilowatt solar-simulator lamp and allows for repeatable testing of solar systems
conducted in a controlled environment to meet standards set by the Canadian Standards
Association16.  It has also given C$2 million to help develop and build a prototype heat and power
plant using fuel cell technology and to help fund small- and medium-sized Canadian companies to
develop auxiliary equipment to improve the power plant's efficiency and commercial potential17.
In December of 2001, NRCan gave a Vancouver company a C$1-million repayable contribution
to demonstrate a low emissions, 1.6 megawatt natural gas engine for stationary electric power
generation18.  The Canadian Gas Association’s ‘Natural Gas Technologies Centre’ recently
completed a technology evaluation project, on residential micro-cogeneration in partnership
NRCan19.
By 1999, the federal government had invested almost C$100 million in fuel cell system
development through the National Research Council and the Natural Sciences and Engineering
Research Council5. The private sector would still like more funding, however, particularly
hydrogen-oriented firms.  Canada’s private sector is a world leader in fuel cell and hydrogen energy
technology. Several Canadian companies, such as Ballard Power Systems, Greenlight Power, Stuart
Energy Systems, Xantrex, and Global Thermoelectric, are currently supporting research,
development, and commercialization of fuel cell technologies.  Ballard has called for the Canadian
government to increase tax incentives and to enhance funding for the demonstration of fuel cell
products, although this call occurred before the 2003 budget20.
Information and Promotion Programs.  In the name of improving market efficiency, the
government has developed a number of information programs.  As mentioned, the federal
government has begun holding seminars on interconnection standards in conjunction with industry,
a process that has the additional benefit of business ‘networking’ according to participants.  Other
workshops are routinely organized such as recent ones on DG engineering R&D21, and microturbine
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applications22.  
Industry Canada has a “Canadian Environmental Solutions” internet directory of Canadian
companies which provide expertise on environmental solutions23.  Similarly, the promotion of
Canadian industry, including DG companies and technologies, occurs all the time during
international “Team Canada” trade missions24. 
One of the more successful information initiatives by the federal government has been the
development of RETScreen® International25.  This software, education and technical support
program for renewable energy projects was developed in cooperation with the US National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the United Nations Environment Program and others.  It
provides physical and economic information and planning support and education worldwide for
those endeavouring to begin renewable energy projects of all kinds.  The software has won awards
and acclaims such as in a report entitled "Economic Evaluation Tools for Distributed Generation",
from E Source Consultants, which found it to be "one of the few software tools, and by far the best,
available for evaluating the economics of renewable energy installations."26.
Consulting.  Two programs of note here include the Sustainable Cities  Initiative (SCI) and
the Community Energy System Group.  The SCI is a trade development program designed to assist
selected cities in developing countries to make progress toward their economic, social and
environmental goals through partnerships with Canadian companies and organizations that offer
technologies and services relevant to Sustainable Development27.   The Community Energy System
Group works with Canadian communities and businesses to help them meet their energy needs
more efficiently and cost-effectively28.  Both programs entail some working with, and promotion
of, DG.
Actions of the Provincial Government of Ontario
Resources.  The province of Ontario obtains its electricity from variety of sources29.  It
generates just over 36% of its electricity from nuclear, 25% from coal, 25% from hydro, 12% from
oil and gas, 0.25%  from miscellaneous sources (wood, waste, renewables, etc.), and the small
remainder is imported.  Demand is projected to grow as much 2.2% per year by 2025 and new gas
plants are projected to grow most as a result2.  Presently, with over 29,000 megawatts produced by
more than 300 plants and transmitted over 29,000km30, Ontario already has a sizeable electrical
power generation system.
Market Structure.  The conservative government of Ontario has arrived at a unique fashion
to operate the electricity industry in the province that is closer to full liberalization but not
completely so31.  Until 1999, the province-owned crown corporation, Ontario Hydro, supplied the
vast majority of power to Ontario consumers.  It was then split into five entities: 1) Ontario Power
Generation Inc., which purchased and assumed the electricity generation, wholesale energy and
ancillary services businesses; 2) Hydro One Inc. (“Hydro One”), which purchased and assumed the
transmission, rural distribution and retail energy services businesses; 3) the Independent Electricity
Market Operator (the “IMO”), which was formed to act as both the independent electricity system
operator and market operator, responsible for the dispatch of generation to meet demand, the control
of the Ontario transmission grid and the operation of energy and ancillary markets; 4) the Electrical
Safety Authority, which was established to carry out electrical equipment and electrical wiring
installation inspection functions; and 5) the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation, which
remains responsible for managing and retiring Ontario Hydro’s outstanding “stranded” debt of C$38
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billion32.  All of these are still provincially owned.  Ontario's 350 small municipal power providers
were required to incorporate.  In 2002, the market was opened to domestic and foreign competition.
Regulations.  A number of new laws will play a role in the future of DG in the province.
The most significant is likely the government fixing of electricity prices at the low price of C$0.043
per kilowattAhour for residential, small business and other designated customers (hospitals, schools,
etc.) until the year 200633.  The policy of continuing to charge transmission fees to those who self-
generate is also continuing to be upheld under the logic that lines were paid for  publically by and
for those who have since become self-generators and so self-generators should continue to uphold
their share until costs are recuperated despite their no longer being part of the system34.  The costs
are significant.  The government claims that by 2008, as more self-generate, transmission rates
could be shifted to small customers by C$65 million, or almost 13%, on an annual basis without
this policy.  
Some new laws don’t speak to DG directly but do open possibilities for DG nonetheless.
The government has removed the requirement for environmental assessment of generation projects
up to 100 megawatts, claims that it is endeavouring to remove “red tape” that acts as a barrier to
the development of clean generation, and has committed to producing 20% of existing government
electricity from renewable energy and 100% of electricity in all of its new buildings from clean
sources35.  
More directly influential actions have been taken however.  These include the introduction
of net metering regulation which allows the sale of self-generated electricity to the grid at grid
prices, and a plan to help First Nations and other remote communities to switch from diesel to wind
generation for their electricity36,37.
Fiscal Policies.   The provincial government has announced a number of taxation changes
which could act to foster clean DG in particular.  Included in these are corporate tax holidays of 10
years for any renewable generation, identical holidays on facilities and other assets needed to
support this, and a complete tax write-off for renewable energy equipment purchase38.  
R&D.  The Ontario government is funding or co-funding a number of projects including
the development of a solid oxide fuel cell combined heat and power plant and other distributed
generation options through Kinetrics Corporation39.  Ontario Power Generation has a subsidiary
called Ontario Power Ventures which invests in private companies developing products or services
in energy-related technologies. Its initial equity investment typically ranges from C$2 million to
C$5 million, but it may make additional investments over time.  Included in its investments are DG
and renewable energy companies40.
Actions in the City of Toronto
Movement toward DG is also occurring at the municipal level. The c ity of Toronto has a
number of programs that foste r distributed energy solutions, but none as famous as the Toronto
Atmospheric Fund which has helped reduce GHG emissions, at a profit, from municipally owned
infrastructure to 67% below 1990 levels, partly through energy efficiency measures, but mostly by
tapping methane from landfill sites in order to generate electricity41,42.  The methane-fuelled
generating stations at the city's landfills have the capacity to produce about 20 megawatts of
electricity, or the amount that would supply the power needs of about 7000 typical homes.  While
it is not argued that such an arrangement is necessarily DG, it is at least a step closer to being so.
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One relevant project recently undertaken in the city of Toronto is the installation of a large
wind turbine on its lakeshore43.  Co-funded by a community-based co-operative and a local utility,
the 750-kilowatt turbine will result in an average output of approximately 1,800,000 kilowattAhours
of electricity per year, or enough for about 250 typical homes.  Funds for a second turbine to be
installed in the city are presently being gathered by the co-operative.
DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING ROOFTOP CLEAN DG
The Elements of a Policy Strategy
Should the overall policy objective be to dramatically increase the number of Turbys
installed on rooftops in Toronto, one strategy is to knock down the various barriers identified in the
conceptual framework outlined in chapter three.  A report in the year 2000 by NRCan identified
five key recommendations for fostering solar PV on buildings in Canada (Table 1)44.  These
recommendations are relevant here because of course PV systems for buildings would experience
many of the same barriers as to rooftop wind turbines.  Indeed, the recommendations can be seen
through the lens of the barriers discussion of chapter three.
The first and second recommendations can be seen as efforts to reduce the technical barriers
of the technology itself and the physical context in which it will exist.  R&D funding and
demonstration projects could help in making the Turby and balance of system technologies more
powerful, quiet, light, user-friendly, and cheap for example. The second and fourth
recommendations help in reducing the market barrier of industry and consumer awareness.  The
third recommendation of removing technical and nonmechanical barriers to interconnection were
addressed in chapter three as a socioeconomic barrier in that this requires legislation and has more
direct political and economic consequences.   The fifth recommendation is a way to fight the price
barrier and involves the development of a niche market and some deployment subsidies.  The latter
could be called “learning investments” in the terminology of experience curves45, and will be
addressed in this context below.
Key recommendations one through four appear to be underway to varying degrees at
present.  However, there is much more that could be done to reduce or overcome the remaining
barriers and make Turbys viable in the near future.  Before a list of possible policy strategies is
delved into below, a brief sketch of what the NRCan authors were referring to in key
recommendation number five is offered.
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Table 1.  In the publication “Photovoltaics for Buildings: Opportunities for Canada” written for
NRCan in 2000, the authors make five ‘key policy recommendations’ should the federal government
wish to develop and deploy rooftop PV systems.  The recommendations are the result of lengthy
discussions and consultations with all who would be involved in the creation of a solar PV market
in the country (ie. industry, municipalities, consultants and associations) (from 44).
Other Rooftop Programs. Some leading developed countries in the OECD have
established policy programmes that aim to support rooftop solar PV development and deployment.
Each of the three examined here does so for its own reasons and in its own way.  Below is a brief
survey of some of the policies that they have attempted.
Japan.  In 1996, oil provided Japan with 55% of its total energy needs, coal 17%, nuclear
power 15%, natural gas 10%, hydroelectric power 3.5%, and 0.3% from solar, wind, and
geothermal power sources46.  Most of this, more than 80%, was imported.  Given its desire to
become more energy independent, its likelihood of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and other concerns,
Japan launched a major rooftop solar PV electricity generation initiative, which was part of an
invigorated ‘New Sunshine Project’ that had begun many years earlier in order to promote
renewable and clean energy development and deployment more generally47.  The program was a
promotional instrument with the goal of removing the barriers to cost reduction, stimulate the
demand for PV, promote the popularisation of residential PV systems and develop better
manufacturing and system technologies and infrastructure. The Japanese government supported PV
deployment in the amount of a 50% purchase subsidy paid to residential end users for a typical size
of 3-4 kW PV system, as well as promotion of residential installations throughout the country. The
initial target for the Japanese program was to deploy 400MW by the year 2000 at which time the
costs of PV electricity would be competitive with base electricity and the subsidies eliminated.
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However, the program has resulted in approximately 331.7 MW of grid-connected rooftop PV
being installed by some 58,733 householders by 200148.
Germany.  Germany was the first country to recognise and capitalize on the potential of
residential rooftop systems niche to expanding the PV market44.  Its 1000 Rooftop Program, which
ran from 1990 to 1995, was supported by a 50% purchase subsidy by Federal and State
governments.  The Program had four goals: harmonising PV roof installations with construction
and architectural aspects; stimulate the users to save electricity and to adapt their consumption
during peak sunshine hours; optimisation of system components; and, gain know-how of
installation methods. In all, 2,056 rooftop PV installations with a total output of 5.3 MW were
installed on the roofs of private houses.  In 1994, the program was over-subscribed and was replaced
by “rate-based” incentive schemes, where city or municipal utilities bought PV-generated
electricity at a buy-back rate of up to more than 10 times the average retail electricity rate.  As with
the 1,000 Roofs Program, the rate-based program was very popular, spreading to approximately 50
municipalities.  It was funded through a 0.75-1% levy on electricity sales by the utilities, usually
after their customers had voted for it. In this way, the funding for the program was derived from
the customer base and not a government subsidy.
The German government then launched its 100,000 Roofs - Solar Electricity - Program in
early 1999 to increase the use of photovoltaic technology in Germany49. Using low-interest loans,
this program aims to spur the installation of some 100,000 PV systems with an average maximum
output of 3 kilowatts ( ie. To a 300 megawatts capacity) by 2005.  The German government
projects its investments to be matched two fold by the private sector.  
The loans have a number of special features.  These include the availability of 10-year zero-
interest loans from the government-owned Kreditansalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW or Bank for
Reconstruction) and administered by private banks, and no payments due during the first two years
with annual payments of 12.5 % due in year's three to nine and waiving the final year's payments
if the system is still operating to specifications. This effectively subsidises the cost PV power
system by 35-40 percent. An added feature of the program is that this financial support is available
in addition to any local or state subsidies or programs. Thus, the cost reduction to the consumer can
be even greater depending on the level of regional support for PV systems. Official guidelines of
the program also offer investors the option of a direct payment, which is reduced to 23% of the
investment amount.  Loans are granted to private persons, private small and medium-sized
commercial businesses and self-employed persons.  
In addition to the loans was a legislative act requiring utilities to pay about i0.50 per
kilowatt hour of solar electricity from grid-connected PV systems installed after 2000, but falling
5% per year afterwards.  A maximum of 350 MW of solar PV systems could apply for the higher
buy-back rates.  Together, the buy-back law and the assistance provided through the 100,000 Roofs
Program nearly cover the cost of installing a photovoltaic system.
USA.  In June 1997, then President Clinton announced a new joint federal initiative called
the Million Solar Roofs Initiative (MSRI), with the goal to install solar energy systems on one
million US buildings by 201050.  This included solar PV cells and solar thermal systems that
produce heat for domestic hot water, space heating, or heating swimming pools.  The US
Department of Energy, heads the program and directs its efforts on national, state and local
partnerships, made up of the building industry, other federal agencies, local and state governments,
utilities, energy service providers, the solar energy industry, financial institutions, and
non-governmental organizations to remove market barriers to solar energy use and develop and
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strengthen local demand for solar energy products and applications. The MSRI does not direct or
control the activities of the state and community partnerships, nor does it provide funding to design,
purchase or install solar energy systems.  Instead, MSRI brings together the capabilities of key
national businesses and organizations and attempts to focus them on building a strong market for
solar energy applications on buildings.  This program, in combination with individual state
incentives for the production and deployment of solar PV, and direct research and development
funding for the improvement of the PV panels themselves helps the US maintain a second place
ranking in the solar industry worldwide.
Overall the strategies of the three nations are similar to the first four of the five ‘key
recommendations’ plan offered by the federal government researchers when investigating building
PV opportunities in Canada except with the addition, to varying extents and in varying ways, of
the subsidization of specific rooftop PV purchases.  The Japanese program seems to be more of a
classical subsidy funded from the public purse.  Electricity prices are very high in Japan and so the
distance between solar electricity prices and grid prices is less than elsewhere.  It might be
surprising then that the program did not meet its target, although this might simply be a reflection
of an ambitious target or any of a number of factors.  The German program offers a more complex,
and more complete subsidy model.  The emphasis on funding through loans would seem to have
many benefits.  In this way there are the advantages of incorporating screening for good candidates,
assuring that the system is achieving the desired output, and increasing the knowledge and
confidence of banks in the technology.  The latter is particularly important as they would remain
as key players when the technology becomes self-sufficient.  Using a levy on utility rates from
other customers who voted to approve for the levy has the advantage of making the funding less
government dependent, spreads awareness to other potential customers, and might even help those
other customers, who might wish to purchase PV systems but are unable to do so, feel that they are
contributing to a ‘greening’ of the electricity system nonetheless.  The US program is possibly more
effective than it might seem upon first glance given the absence of federal subsidy.  Given the
enormous influence of vested interests there, the program might be all that was politically feasible,
and there are some incentives coming from other programs.  State incentives vary highly across the
country, but can sometimes be significant51.  The State of Maryland, for example, which has its
own solar roofs program, offers loan assistance, tax credits and exemptions, net metering rules,
construction guideline policies, and a solar rebate program funded by oil overcharge funds52.
Exploiting Niche Markets.  Another way to look at the three programs sketched above is
in terms of learning curves for presently pricey clean DG intersecting with learning curves for
established technologies53.  That is, at present the curves for new energy technologies, such as PV
panels and rooftop wind turbines, have higher slopes due to their technological and market
immaturity.  Slopes of the established technologies are nearly flat by comparison.  In this scheme,
the programs from Japan, Germany and the US are seen as attempts by those governments to
increase the cumulative sales of these immature technologies and ‘ride the experience curve’ to the
break-even point.  In doing so the cumulative investments they make are called ‘learning
investments’.
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Figure 2.  Experience curves of an immature technology, in this case solar PV,
intersecting with that of an established technology, in this case the fossil fuel
alternative, at the ‘Break-even’ point of equivalent price per unit of power produced.
The investments needed to ride the upper curve to the break-even point are the
‘Learning Investments’ (From 53).
Time is not a dimension on these curves.  However, time is important of course in policy
considerations as technologies can become established over time, reach their maturity, consistently
out-perform others in terms of price, and in this fashion keep the others ‘locked-out’ of the market.
That is, investments in mid- to long-term technologies are chosen from those that exist today and
not those of the future and they are largely chosen on price. In this way, there is a  prevention of
necessary learning investments by the market.  One way to overcome the lock-out is through
subsidy and one way minimize the necessary investments is to subsidize the new technologies in
niches where the difference between their price and the established alternative is not as high.  The
hope is that once established in these niches, the technology can become self-propelling from there,
or in a way locked-in there (or ‘docked-in’), and thus receive a more secured source of learning
investments after that point for the eventual ride down the greater learning curve towards
competitiveness in the utility electricity markets (Figure 3).  Such niches include the electricity
peak times should there be higher rates charged or mandated for these times, isolated and remote
power stations, traffic and billboard signs, and areas where distribution costs are significant.  Aid
for developing countries might also be considered a source of learning investment money, or a
niche market of a slightly different sort.
57
Figure 3.  The intersection of the experience curve for solar PV with both the central power
plant fossil fuel alternative and the experience curve in the pricier niche markets in Japan.
The learning investments to meet the niche market break-even point are less than those to
meet the open market break-even point (adapted from 53).
Further Policy Options.  Of course, there are even more ways, in addition to the five key
elements examined so far, that a government could foster rooftop wind electricity generation in
Toronto.  It should be said at first though that the five key recommendations mentioned thus far are
likely attractive mostly for their relative political and technical ease.  That is, it is comparatively
easy to subsidise from the public purse, promote new technologies and demonstration projects, and
establish interconnection guidelines.  Further policy options, in terms of the price barrier and in
terms of the intersecting experience curves concept, would mostly be efforts to increase the number
or size of niche markets, or efforts aimed at raising the price of established sources of electricity.
Doing so immediately raises the likelihood of actions by vested interests in the established
generating industries and high electricity consuming industries.  It might also face resistance from
the general public who would not wish higher prices and it raises equity issues as the poor would
be most negatively affected by electricity price increases.
All of these problems can be addressed and overcome and so it does not follow that efforts
to raise the price of electricity from established sources should not be done.  Instead, it means that
further policies would need to be done with a greater degree of sophistication and based on a
rationale for a significant intervention into the market that would be strong enough to be adequately
well-received politically.  Given the problems outlined in chapter one, ample rationale for clean
DG will be assumed here.  What then might be some of the more sophisticated policy options?
All the barriers addressed in chapter three are significant.  However, the price barrier is
possibly the most significant.  This is so not only because of the significant role that price plays
even amongst those who can afford other options, but also because it is arguably the issue that most
affects the others.  Public awareness will grow rapidly if Turbys are cheap.  Misplaced incentives
might be less of a barrier if Turbys are cheap.  Financial institutions might even be taken out of the
picture if turbines could be rendered sufficiently inexpensive.  Consumers would be more willing
to spend extra efforts to connect if ultimately the electricity was cheaper than that from the grid.
Alternately, energy service companies could have higher margins if the Turbys they help install are
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Table 2.  A range of possible legislative actions with the ultimate goal of increasing Turby price competitiveness.
cheap.  In short, a low price and it actualizes.  In general, in order improve price competitiveness,
there has to be some sort of technological breakthrough, a subsidy, a price increase on alternatives
or all three.
Possible Regulatory Actions.  There is of course an enormous number and variety of rules
that could be conceived of to affect the price of Turbys and/or their competition.  Some regulations
that might be more effective at achieving this goal are listed in Table 2.
The suggestions in the table are just a sampling of possibilities that might help towards
increasing Turby competitiveness.  Some are more politically, economically and technically
feasible than others.  All could be modified, weakened or strengthened by different conditions and
criteria.  The point is not to delve into the details of each possibility but instead to portray the
possibilities and limitations of the legislative approach.  Amongst the more influential policies
would likely be the peak rate pricing, targets, loan laws and building code changes.  
The advantages of legislative actions are that they can be discussed with stakeholders in
order to help promote the need for changes and arrive at the most appropriate and reasonable rules.
They can be very specific or targeted in their effects, and goals and standards will be more easily
monitored and measured for performance.  Businesses are accustomed to this form of government
intervention and laws allow for all parties to be more readily aware of rules.
The disadvantages of legislative actions include mounting bureaucratic costs and expertise,
non-compliance or circumvention issues, political favouritism, and problems of standard
determination.  They do not always promote creative solutions, nor do they usually promote the
surpassing of standards.  They can be used by different market actors to minimize competition and
they can slow down different economic projects.  In short, the devil is in their details and these
must be considered very carefully for there are often unforeseen effects.
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Figure 4.  Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection and Natural Resource
Management (From 54).  Broken lines indicate affinity between different categories of
instruments.
Possible Economic Instruments.  Economic instruments are increasingly popular amongst
developed nations as a means to bring about environmental change54.  They are perceived as cheaper
and thought likely to be be tter able to motivate change in given directions, although there is less
experience with them and instruments of change and more as additional sources of revenue in
developed countries at the moment.  Economic instruments are sometimes hard to introduce into
systems that have strong legislative traditions both because of a lack of familiarity with their use
and because of difficulties in switching from one form of policy to the other.  Market deregulation
and industry restructuring, however, provide a good opportunity for their increased use.  Economics
instruments, in combination with legislative ‘command and control’ options are hoped to offer a
more well-rounded and effective arsenal of tools to governments that are less distorting of market
function but at the same time compensate for its failures.  Figure 4 offers a typology of different
instruments available.
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Fiscal instruments such as taxes and subsidies can be used to help adjust for benefits and
costs that are not otherwise taken into consideration in market transactions.   They can in this way
more accurately reflect the complete cost of transactions to the overall system.  In so doing it is
hoped that the improved signals to the market actors for their decision making will help towards
the creation and maintenance of a sustainable system.  
Increased taxes can be placed on any of a number of attributes of established generating
technologies.  They can be taxed on their non-electrical outputs (pollution and noise), their levels
of energy efficiency, their purchase, their continued existence, and on their electrical output.
Taxation of the different attributes has its pros and cons in terms of achieving different goals from
pollution reduction to resource use reduction.  Each taxable attribute is also associated with
different technical collection issues (how to measure pollution, consumption, etc.).  As alluded to
above, tax revenues can in turn be used in a variety of ways.  They can be given back to their
sources on condition of different behaviours (the purchase of clean DG for example), or in
proportion to the energy efficiency of their generation plants, for example.  They can be used to
support clean DG subsidy, promotion or R&D.  They can also be used for general revenue or they
can be revenue neutral and run simply for the purposes of market redirection.  To the extent that
taxation might hurt the poor, revenue from it can be partially redirected to the poor in any of a
number of ways from income tax alleviation to subsidisation of their utility bills.  Taxes could also
be progressive at the company level by charging in proportion to company size in the name of
avoiding monopoly, something that is particularly important to do in electricity markets.
Taxes can also be placed on any of a number of related industries, technologies, and
infrastructures which affect the price of centralized electricity from fossil fuels or nuclear power.
 From higher taxes on revenue from utility dividends to shareholders, to taxes on oil, gas and coal
use, to taxation of transmission and distribution infrastructure, a significant number of sources are
possible.
 In order to adhere to the ‘polluter pays’ principle, subsidies should be derived from tax
revenue from pollution or resource depletion.  Often, however, they are paid for with revenue from
general taxation which is mostly the result of income, work, savings and investment taxes.
Subsidies also have the long-term problems of runaway costs should new or expanded players to
the market continue to demand subsidy.  One type of subsidy could come from charges or taxes a
variety of environmental ‘wrongs’ that are put into a general ‘green fund’.  These might not get the
returns that a finance departments would like but might be useful for DG projects.  Another form
of subsidy is government procurement.  Governments could rationalize expensive electricity
purchases in the name of creating learning opportunities for developing technologies such as Turbys
and other clean DG.
An alternative to direct taxation and subsidy that also has the effect of increasing the cost
of conventionally generated electricity and supporting either lower or non-polluters, is the creation
of markets exchanging tradable permits.   Such systems are particularly popular at the moment and
have been used for electricity before in the context of acid precipitation mitigation.  There is also
a significant movement towards their use in the context of GHG emission mitigation for under the
Kyoto Protocol. These can be amongst polluters and lesser polluters or they can be between
polluters and non-polluters such as in the case of renewable energy certificates.  Due to the
complications involved in setting up a market, small levels of generation might or might not
qualify, or be worthwhile economically in such systems.  As seen in chapter two, it is possible that
only very small levels of GHGs might be displaced and power generated.  This type of system
might or might not be promising for small, clean DG projects.
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CHAPTER 5 – POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSIONS
AND FINAL REMARKS
Overview
This chapter offers a six point policy recommendation that could serve as the basis for a
cohesive policy initiative.  The recommendations assume that relevant political actors decide that
clean DG is a more urgent priority than they do at present and that the Turby is deemed a worthy
technology to support towards this end.  It then summarizes the findings and responses to the three
questions forming the basis of this exploration. 
Policy Recommendations
There is a significant number and variety of different ways that the Turby could be fostered
in Toronto.  Chapter four emphasized methods related to price reduction as these are primary.
However other events having less to do with price directly could ultimately help reduce the price.
Should more ice storms regularly hit Ontario, DG might increase in value, for example.  Should
associations between oil and gas use and geo-political conflict be made, or increased in strength,
in the minds of the people, or should terrorist attacks occur on nuclear power stations or hydro
dams, significant increases in the use of clean DG would likely result.
At present, however, clean DG technologies are caught in the ‘catch-22’ of needing
increased sales to reduce prices and reduced prices to increase sales.  The main method out of this
quandary is through help that is external to the market.  This is typically done by governments, but
it can also be done through smaller collections of people such as the Toronto Renewable Energy
Cooperative (TREC) which apparently played the most significant role in establishing the lone
wind turbine on the lakefront as mentioned in this work.
This last fact raises a key consideration in efforts to make clean DG, and the Turby in
particular, a reality.  A radical shift in a network of related policies, all for the betterment of a small
number of technologies and practices that will compete with established technologies and practices
would be politically precarious if done in a top-down way, especially from higher levels of
government.  Over-ambitious targets, excessively strict environmental standards and detailed
environmental action plans, should they not be matched by equal enforcement capability, funding
and public service enthusiasm, tend to damage the credibility of governments as environmental
investors.  There is therefore always the danger of negatively affecting the public’s future
willingness to pay for environmental investments.  An exclusively top-down approach also involves
the choice of an energy system vision.  Energy services can be acquired in a significant variety of
ways, using a significant variety of technologies.  Policies promoting one set of technologies,
especially in an uncertain time about the exact shape of future energy systems, might overly
commit the country or region to a given direction and make subsequent shifts more difficult.  These
two issues highlight the need to include bottom-up actions, actors and visions, such as TREC, in
any policy strategy.  This is not to say that bottom-up actions are preferable.  Actors and actions
focussing exclusively on local issues also have their pitfalls and hangups.  It is a balance of the two
approaches that is argued for here.  What this might amount to is a financial or political
empowerment of local community or business groups by higher levels of government in order to
allow them to circumvent their local barriers and in order to gain local, grassroots public support
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for initiatives that are desirable not only from a local perspective but also from provincial or
national perspectives.  
The importance of local actors and actions is further underscored by the nature of the Turby
technology and the electric resource acquisition and distribution strategy it represents.   It is
ultimately about a shift in the electricity system architecture towards a physical empowerment of
the individual which results in an economic and political empowerment of the individual.  The
amount of motivation required for this kind of shift in individual action and expertise is presently
not within the norms of Canadian culture as sketched out in chapter three.  This might arguably be
best overcome at first by local movements, such as energy cooperatives, which are better able to
motivate, support and maintain enthusiasm for such new technologies and practices in their pre-
market stages.
The overall policy strategy recommendation to governments is thus to incorporate the five
recommendations as arrived at by government and industry for the Canadian rooftop PV market
and listed in chapter four, with a modified number five and an additional assortment of
miscellaneous extras.
That is, it is minimally recommended to:
1. support Turbys with R&D funding; 
2. foster collaboration amongst stakeholders, especially local cooperatives, to establish
demonstration projects (perhaps in tandem with green roof initiatives);
3.  remove interconnection barriers and immediately related issues;
4.  support promotional efforts of various kinds;
5.  replicate the process of subsidy seen in the solar PV rooftop programs of the US state
of Maryland and the country of Germany (by offering loan assistance, tax credits and
exemptions, net metering rules including mandatory and fixed rate utility buy-back,
construction guideline policies, and a rebate program funded through a green fund of some
polluting source or through utility surcharge as in Germany); and
6.  undertake any or all of the following changes: government purchasing quotas, renewable
targets for utilities, and increased prices of electricity from centralized fossil fuel and
nuclear sources through permit market creation, taxes and/or pollution standards.
As discussed in chapter three, the recommendations can be seen as addressing barriers
identified.  All of these would ideally take place at as local a level of government as is required and
receive the funding from governments best able to appropriately fund the actions.
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Conclusions
This project investigated the issues surrounding the possible development and expansion
of the use of one clean DG technology in one specific location – a small vertical axis wind turbine
on the rooftops of the city of Toronto.  It set out to address the extent to which this technology can
help address problems such as meeting new electricity demand, reducing emissions, and increasing
individual company electricity self-sufficiency.  In the work there was also an attempt to
approximate, in a very crude fashion, the numbers of turbines required and the ensuing price of
electricity from the turbines.  Only in an unreasonably high range scenario assuming maximum
uptake of the Turby by the market, maximum functioning in all winds throughout the year, and
prices about 10 and 100 fold less than present does the electricity from rooftop wind become price
competitive with the government set grid electricity price in Ontario.  In this same high range
scenario, at most about 1% of GHG emissions would be reduced.  However, full electricity
independence might be attained for individual businesses.  In effect this scenario describes an as
yet unmade rooftop turbine with the required attributes for market uptake.  The calculations are
based on data that does not sufficiently reveal the effect of height, temperature and other variables
that significantly effect Turby functioning and which would make for physical niches within the
city where the Turby might function closer to this ideal.
There was then an exploration of the various barriers preventing the turbines from reaching
their full technical potential.  The chief barrier to the proliferation of the rooftop wind turbines is
presently their price.  The high price of the electricity from the turbines is particularly unhelpful
in their attempts at proliferation in Toronto given the low price of electricity legislated there by the
provincial government.  Knocking down the price barrier will help in the further knocking down
of other barriers.  These other barriers include, but are not limited to, the significant consumer effort
that must presently take place in order to generate electricity from the rooftop turbines, misplaced
incentives between landlords and tenants, and possible general rejection issues due to conceptual
or aesthetic biases of consumers.
An examination of the actions and policies that have and could be taken by the relevant
governments and other actors in order to knock down barriers and establish this electricity
alternative in the city was then undertaken.  Many of the actions taken to date have been done in
order to help increase the competitiveness of less-clean DG alternatives (such as diesel engines and
microturbines).  However, these actions will nonetheless act to establish precedents, rules, new
norms and a general awareness and that will likely facilitate the eventual emergence of clean DG
technologies. A six point policy plan is recommended in the event that the development and
deployment of the rooftop turbines might be seen as desirable by relevant governments or
community groups.  It is suggested that the turbines should be financially supported for further
R&D efforts, promotional programs and demonstration projects.  This support would be particularly
well-placed in local community groups such as the Toronto Renewable Energy Cooperative and
in conjunction with efforts to establish and proliferate the occurrence of green roofs.  The further
removal of interconnection barriers and immediately related issues should also be undertaken.  It
is then suggested to replicate the process of subsidy seen in the solar PV rooftop programs
elsewhere, particularly those of the US state of Maryland and the country of Germany (where there
was an offering of loan assistance, tax credits and exemptions, net metering rules including
mandatory and fixed rate utility buy-back, construction guideline policies, and a rebate program
funded through a green fund of some polluting source such as in Maryland or through utility
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surcharge as in Germany)  Finally, an assortment of further actions is recommended which
ultimately aim to either raise the price of electricity generated in conventional forms or create niche
markets for the technology.  These include government purchasing quotas, renewable targets for
utilities, and increased prices of electricity from centralized fossil fuel and nuclear sources through
permit market creation, taxes and/or pollution standards.
Final Remarks
While the advantages to central generation have lead to its rise and predominance in modern
electricity architectural design, the disadvantages have increased in number and severity, especially
in the last quarter of the 20th century.  Technological breakthroughs, market deregulation and
environmental and social events and regulations have lead to the increased viability of distributed
electrical generation as an alternative that can positively address many of the disadvantages
associated with central generation.  As a result, DG is beginning to flourish globally. However,
some DG technologies are beginning to grow more than others.  That is, at present, the DG
technologies based on fossil fuels are beginning to proliferate more rapidly than those based on
clean renewable energy sources. 
While its exact fate is of course unknown, distributed generation as an electricity
procurement strategy will undoubtedly increase in prevalence in the near future.   At the moment
the barriers are first being knocked down and the new niches occupied by technologies employing
less clean, and ultimately finite, energy sources in order to generate electricity.  While this might
seem like a less than perfect alternative , it seems likely that this will ultimately establish market
and social frameworks for the eventual entrance of DG based on technologies harvesting clean,
renewable sources of energy.  In the meantime, a host of actions can be taken to assure that such
a technological succession over time might take place should pertinent parties wish it to occur.
